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REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: THE SOCIAL NETWORK
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch† & Margaret S. Williams††
As class certification wanes, plaintiffs’ lawyers resolve
hundreds of thousands of individual lawsuits through aggre-
gate settlements in multidistrict litigation.  But without class
actions, formal rules are scarce and judges rarely scrutinize
the private agreements that result.  Meanwhile, the same prin-
cipal-agent concerns that plagued class-action attorneys lin-
ger.  These circumstances are ripe for exploitation: few rules,
little oversight, multi-million dollar common-benefit fees, and a
push for settlement can tempt a cadre of repeat players to fill
in the gaps in ways that further their own self-interest.
Although multidistrict litigation now comprises 36% of the
pending federal civil caseload, legal scholars have offered lit-
tle sustained theoretical or empirical analysis as to how re-
peat players’ enforcement efforts shape litigation or claims
resolution.  We wade into this increasingly controversial terri-
tory to offer the first comprehensive empirical investigation of
private attorneys’ efforts in multidistrict leadership on both the
plaintiff and defense side.  We found that transferee judges
regularly appoint the same lead attorneys.
To then uncover what the naked eye cannot see, we em-
ployed a social-network analysis to reveal repeat actors’ con-
nections to one another.  No matter what measure of centrality
we used, a key group of attorneys maintained their elite posi-
tion within the network.  This matters considerably, for lead
lawyers control the proceeding and negotiate settlements.
They can bargain for what may matter to them most: defend-
ants want to end lawsuits, and plaintiffs’ lawyers want to
† Charles H. Kirbo Chair of Law, University of Georgia Law School.  Our
thanks to Christina Boyd, Brannon Denning, Emery Lee, Kay Levine, Jonathan
Nash, Adam Zimmerman, anonymous transferee judges, and anonymous mul-
tidistrict litigation attorneys, as well as participants at Duke Law School’s Mass-
Tort MDL Program for Judicial Conference Committees, and Emory/UGA’s faculty
workshop for their comments on earlier drafts and insights on the topic.  Thanks
also to Payton Bradford, Hayes Dever, and Kyle Hollomon for their research and
data collection assistance, and especially to Georgia School of Law for generously
funding this research.  With one exception in 2009, Professor Burch has never
provided outside consulting or expert witness services.  No outside funding or
grants have been used to fund our work.
†† Visiting Assistant Professor at Vanderbilt Law School.
1445
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt unknown Seq: 2 29-SEP-17 12:56
1446 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1445
recover for their clients and receive high fee awards along the
way.
By identifying settlement provisions that one might argue
principally benefit the repeat players, we examined the pub-
licly available nonclass settlements these elite lawyers de-
signed.  Over a twenty-two-year span, we were unable to find
any deal that did not feature at least one closure provision for
defendants, and likewise found that nearly all settlements
contained some provision that increased lead plaintiffs’ law-
yers’ common-benefit fees.  Bargaining for attorneys’ fees with
one’s opponent is a stark departure from traditional contin-
gent-fee principles, which are designed to tie lawyers’ fees to
their clients’ outcome.  Based on the evidence available to us,
we found reason to be concerned that when repeat players
influence the practices and norms that govern multidistrict
proceedings—when they “play for rules,” so to speak—the
rules they develop may principally benefit them at the expense
of one-shot plaintiffs.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1447 R
I. THE RISE OF REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1453 R
A. The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation and the
Lack of Formal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1455 R
B. Why Repeat Players are so Likely in
Multidistrict Litigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1459 R
1. Lead Lawyer Selection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . 1460 R
2. Emphasis on Factors that Favor Repeat
Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1461 R
3. Settlement Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1463 R
C. Costs and Benefits of Repeat Play—Why This
Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1465 R
II. EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING REPEAT PLAY: THE SOCIAL
NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1469 R
A. Data Description and Sample Selection . . . . . . 1470 R
B. The Network Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1472 R
C. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1475 R
1. The Social Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1475 R
2. Centrality’s Importance to Leadership
Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1484 R
III. EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING THE DEALS THOSE REPEAT
PLAYERS DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1488 R
A. Settlement Attorneys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1495 R
B. Settlement Provisions and Lead Lawyers’
Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1496 R
1. Closure Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1504 R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt unknown Seq: 3 29-SEP-17 12:56
2017] REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1447
2. Common-Benefit Fee Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1509 R
3. Latecomer Reductions and Reversion
Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1514 R
IV. IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1516 R
A. Repeat Players’ Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1518 R
B. Implications for Leverage, Ethics, and
Collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1521 R
C. Implications for Law Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1526 R
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1532 R
INTRODUCTION
Time and again judges appoint the same plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to lead large multidistrict litigations, then compensate
them handsomely for doing so.  But identifying repetitive play
is merely the tip of the iceberg, for what lies beneath repeat
plaintiff and defense attorneys’ formal interactions has critical
implications for the development of law and the fulfillment of
fundamental procedural and tort goals such as fairness, effi-
ciency, compensation, and deterrence.  When repeat players
interact over time, their past and present connections can im-
pact norm development and entrenchment.  Social architecture
may thus affect how actors perceive ethically grey areas in
structuring aggregate settlements, whether they privilege self-
interest over clients’ interests, and how they approach regula-
tory ambiguities.
Because hard-and-fast formal rules are scarce when mul-
tidistrict litigation is not certified as a class action, transferee
judges tend to seek guidance from predecessors, peers, and
lawyers who have litigated other multidistrict proceedings.1
Even though multidistricting aims to avoid duplicative pretrial
efforts, most cases settle.2  So, the small cadre of repeat players
1 For example, the Zyprexa litigation heavily influenced both the Guidant
and the Vioxx litigation. E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 560 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at
*17–18 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (limiting multidistrict proceedings to pretrial
litigation only); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 40 (1998).  The Panel has remanded only 2.9% of cases to their original
districts.  Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil ac-
tions for pretrial proceedings.  By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions had
been remanded for trial, 398 had been reassigned within the transferee districts,
359,432 had been terminated in the transferee courts, and 89,123 were pending
throughout the district courts. UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIS-
TRICT LITIGATION–JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statis-
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and the procedural norms they develop are integral to resolving
the cases.
The prevalence of norms over formal, legal precedent af-
fords repeat players a critical opportunity.  As they act strategi-
cally to maximize gains over a series of cases, and play for
“rules,” the shorthand term for standardized practices that will
tip the scales in their favor in future cases, those rules may well
stick.  When layered atop “bet-the-company” litigation, multi-
million-dollar attorneys’ fees, and significant media attention,
the full picture for potential abuse and influence begins to
emerge.  Multidistrict cases like those against Volkswagen over
its emission-defeat device3 and General Motors over its igni-
tion-switch defect4 have increased in both prominence and
quantity; they have risen from 16% of the federal courts’ civil
caseload in 2002 to 36% in 2014.5  Excluding social security
and prisoner cases escalates that number to 45.6%.6  Conse-
quently, through publicity, replication, and proportion, key
players’ influence and rules can impact the entire civil justice
system.7
High stakes, rising filings, private settlements, and signifi-
cant attorneys’ fees—sometimes more than $350 million8 in
common-benefit fees alone—have spurred heated debate.  Mul-
tidistrict litigation’s champions herald its quiet efficiency and
ability to benefit claimants and attorneys through uniform de-
cisions and resolutions.9  But critics suggest that it can lead to




3 In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., No. 15-md-2672 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
4 In re GM LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
5 MDL Standards and Best Practices x, DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUD. STUD. (2014).
6 Id. at x–xi.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
8 See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA.
L. REV. 371, 385 (2014).
9 E.g., id. at 380; John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the
Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2233 (2008).
10 E.g., In re United States Lines, Inc., 1998 WL 382023, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(explaining appellants’ description of the asbestos multidistrict litigation as “a
black hole” and “the third level of Dante’s inferno”); John G. Heyburn II & Francis
E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 27, 31 (2012)
(“The single most prominent complaint about multidistrict litigation arises from
counsel’s negative experiences in so-called black hole cases—those that seem not
to move at an acceptable pace.”); Linda Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the
Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) (noting
that the use of “quasi-class action,” a term used in some multidistrict proceed-
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The lead attorneys who run these litigations must act as
fiduciaries to all plaintiffs, yet critics claim that those lawyers
have engaged in self-enriching acts: by offering lead lawyers’
“ ‘red-carpet treatment on fees’ in return for favorable terms
elsewhere,” defendants can take advantage of lead attorneys’
control over settlement negotiations to strike deals that benefit
the leaders and the defendant, but not the claimants.11  Moreo-
ver, because transferee judges handpick lead attorneys and
control their financial remuneration through fee transfers from
non-lead attorneys, critics contend that “obedience is the pru-
dent course for non-lead lawyers . . . .”12  Critics likewise note
that, as “veterans,” leaders “have developed an arsenal of strat-
egies to corral, convince, and coerce other lawyers to come
together for purposes of organizing and settling cases en
masse.”13  Yet, repeat players explain that it is only through
their extensive experience and financial means that they can
“go toe to toe” with big defense firms.14
Despite this burgeoning battle over multidistrict proceed-
ings and the ramifications of repeat play, relatively little empiri-
cal research exists.  This Article begins to fill that gap not just
by collecting data or investigating the centrality of repeat plain-
tiff and defense attorneys, but also by analyzing the results
they obtain on behalf of themselves and their clients.  Part I
launches this inquiry with a look into the circumstances be-
hind multidistrict litigation’s ascent and its absence of formal
rules.  When formal rules are scarce, socially constructed rules
and norms impact legal outcomes on a broad scale.  Accord-
ingly, this Part theorizes the ways in which current practices,
including judicial methods for selecting lead lawyers, create
fertile conditions for repeat play and norm development.  It
likewise evaluates the costs and benefits of appointing repeat
players, and thus rounds out the usual efficiency maxim that
typically justifies centralizing cases.15
ings, “is a convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless administration of
aggregate claims.”).
11 Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Man-
aging Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 133
(2010).
12 Id. at 110.
13 Myriam Gilles, Tribal Rituals of the MDL, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 174 (2012).
14 Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28, 2015;
see also Perry Cooper, MDLs Led by Usual Suspects, and Not Everyone is Happy,
BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. RPT., June 24, 2016.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (noting that transfer must “promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions”).
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By focusing on the institutional players who routinely—
and somewhat administratively—negotiate and settle similar
claims, this Article then adds three missing ingredients to the
empirical and theoretical literature on aggregate litigation.
First, Part II introduces an affiliation network analysis (a scien-
tific approach to understanding how agents in a complex sys-
tem interact)16 to visualize the connections among plaintiffs’
attorneys and between lead plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys.
To do this, we built an original dataset out of all the judicially
selected lead lawyers in all product liability and sales practice
proceedings pending on the multidistrict litigation docket as of
May 2013—seventy-three total proceedings.  The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel) centralized those
proceedings over a twenty-two-year span and collectively they
include over 312,500 actions.
Using that data for the social-network analysis, Part II cap-
tures the interplay between lead plaintiff and defense attor-
neys.  When many agents interact—judges, multiple attorneys,
and defendants, for instance—game theory’s traditional ana-
lytic focus on bilateral interactions can break down.17  Network
analysis, however, provides us with a tool for mapping the com-
plex connections between many people (lead attorneys) and
events (multidistrict proceedings), allows us to identify critical
actors and proceedings, and helps us to theorize more accu-
rately about how multidistricting promotes efficiency and re-
solves cases.18  With the network intact, we can then
hypothesize about what flows through it and what repeat play-
ers’ connectedness might mean to the outcomes they generate.
Central actors might, for example, wield their power to create
16 Daniel M. Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network
Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 467 (2010).
17 As John Miller and Scott Page point out:
When an agent interacts with only a few other agents, we can usu-
ally trace all of the potential actions and reactions.  When an agent
faces an infinity of other agents, we can average out . . . the behavior
of the masses and again find ourselves back in a world that can
easily be traced.  It is in between these two extremes—when an
agent interacts with a moderate number of others—that our tradi-
tional analytic tools break down.
JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 221 (2007).
18 See generally NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE
SURPRISING POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 9–10
(2009) (describing network attributes).
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and develop rules, influence settlement design, and shape ethi-
cal norms.19
Accordingly, Part III introduces the second ingredient
missing from current scholarship: an empirical analysis of both
the settlements repeat players design and the common-benefit
fee practices used to compensate lead plaintiffs’ lawyers.  While
the presence of tightly networked multidistrict-litigation attor-
neys is hardly surprising given our past findings,20 the influ-
ence these key players have on settlements has been largely
ignored.  Looking at the attorneys within the network, we con-
firmed that one of the top five most connected repeat players
participated directly in each settled proceeding’s leadership.
We then analyzed the publicly available nonclass settlements
that resulted within our dataset for provisions that may be
more beneficial to counsel than to litigants.  This brought to
light the practices and norms that influential actors used to
foster settlement and influence attorneys’ fees outside of certi-
fied class actions.
All of the examined settlements featured at least one provi-
sion that encouraged closure and finality (which benefits the
defendant), and nearly all settlements contained some provi-
sion that increased lead plaintiffs’ lawyers’ common-benefit
fees.  When plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate their fees with the de-
fendant, it raises questions about self-dealing for it severs the
traditional contingent-fee tie between attorneys and their cli-
ents and may compromise attorneys’ loyalties.21  We thus
found reason to be concerned that the rules and norms that
repeat players collectively design may benefit them at the ex-
pense of one-shot plaintiffs.
To be sure, there is no viable means to demonstrate
whether repeat play generates “better” or “worse” client out-
comes, for few alternative settlement values are publicly availa-
ble for comparison.  And clauses that one might label as self-
dealing or primarily benefitting counsel arise in the class con-
text, too.22  But multidistrict litigation lacks Rule 23’s struc-
19 See CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES, CON-
CEPTS, AND FINDINGS 202 (2013) (“[Social networks] are influenced by and respon-
sive to social norms and institutions.  Through repeated interactions, new norms
and institutions are created.”).
20 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 95–101 (2015); Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R.
Borden, Repeat Players in Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 149–60
(Apr. 2014, backdated to 2012).
21 Silver & Miller, supra note 11, at 134. R
22 Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 904 (2017).
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tural assurances of fairness—judicial settlement approval,
objectors, and appeals.  Setting aside bad faith and overt collu-
sion, the fact that the same players appear in the vast majority
of these proceedings and design remarkably similar settle-
ments that benefit themselves raises new questions about ade-
quate representation and the need for strong case management
in multidistrict litigation.
Consequently, Part IV adds the third missing ingredient to
the theoretical literature on aggregate litigation by exploring
the impact well-connected repeat actors may have on case res-
olutions, ethical norms, and law reform.  Take ethics, for exam-
ple: the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were founded on
an individual attorney-client relationship, and although rules
like 1.8(g) (the aggregate settlement rule) have evolved to ad-
dress some concerns in mass representation, doctrinal confu-
sion over the rule’s application has opened it up to
manipulation and social construction by the very parties it
seeks to regulate.23  If the lines between ethical and unethical
behavior blur and pushing boundaries benefits central players
who possess the power and means to sanction others, that
behavior may turn into the accepted norm.24  Accordingly, Part
IV concludes by considering what effect a cohesive network of
repeat actors may have on law reform efforts.  Given agents’
historical adaptability, regulatory designers may find more
success with flexible measures that harness competitive forces
already in play than top-down, external reforms.
23 E.g., Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The
Evolving Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–304 (2015).
24 Francesca Gina et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior,
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 393–94, 398 (2009); see also Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher,
Social Norms and Human Cooperation, 4 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 185, 186–87
(2004) (discussing the relationship between social norms and punishment).  Pro-
fessor Charles Kadushin explains transmission through networks as follows:
[S]omething may be transmitted or diffused through (1) contact that
involves some form of influence, persuasion, or coercion—for exam-
ple, someone teaches me something or influences me to do some-
thing, to think a certain way, or provide me with a new tool; (2)
contact that involves some kind of emulation—for example, my
friend has an idea or tool that I think it would be useful to have; or
(3) adoption or emulation without direct social contact—for exam-
ple, I hear or read about something that I like.
KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 135. R
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I
THE RISE OF REPEAT PLAYERS IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION
Most people experience only the periphery of the legal sys-
tem: requesting marriage licenses, paying traffic violations, ex-
ecuting and probating wills, and sometimes getting divorced.
But, because of their profession or their size, certain people
and corporations encounter the judicial system regularly—
think Walmart or attorneys, for example.  Of course, there is a
wide margin between these two ends of the spectrum, and
many people will have casual repeat encounters, falling some-
where in between “one-shotters” and more extensive “repeat
players” as we use the term.25
Spurred by Marc Galanter’s iconic work in the field, aca-
demics have long expected that routine repeat players who en-
counter the legal system time and again will have different
goals than one-shotters.  Regulars develop expertise, have a
stable of go-to specialists, cultivate relationships with institu-
tional incumbents like judges and their staff, and enjoy econo-
mies of scale with low start-up costs for any given case.26
Because they encounter the system and its inhabitants fre-
quently, their reputation becomes important27: attorneys
might develop reputations as masterful trial lawyers or settle-
ment artists, and corporations might decide to vigorously de-
fend even meritorious cases to signal that they are not easy
targets.  Finally, repeat players tend to litigate with more in
mind than just the stakes of a particular lawsuit.  They may act
strategically to maximize gains over a series of cases, and play
for “rules,” the short-hand term for standard practices and
norms that will tip the scales in their favor in future cases.28
Much of the literature surrounding repeat players contem-
plates litigants as the repeat players—Walmart, Merck, or
Johnson & Johnson.29  And it is true that major corporate
defendants are repeat actors in multidistrict litigation.  But
they are not the only ones.  Many plaintiffs’ and defense attor-
25 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13,




29 E.g., Galanter, supra note 25, at 19, 22; see Ryan C. Black & Christina L. R
Boyd, U.S. Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 286, 287–88 (2012).
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neys are repeat players, too.30  This leaves only one group as
probable one-shotters: the plaintiffs themselves, and perhaps
their individually retained attorney who must cede control to
the judicially appointed lead lawyers—but typically not the lead
lawyers themselves.  To avoid having to coordinate with hun-
dreds of attorneys, the judge appoints a small cadre of lawyers
to run the lawsuit and make decisions on the group’s behalf.
Although plaintiffs’ lead lawyers owe fiduciary obligations of
loyalty to the plaintiffs, their judicial appointment insulates
them from being fired or hired through conventional means.31
Corporate defendants, with a large cadre of sophisticated
in-house attorneys, can easily and effectively monitor outside
counsel.  But multidistrict-litigation plaintiffs may be doubly
disadvantaged: they are not only one-shotters, they also tend to
be less knowledgeable about the law, which is, after all, why
they hired an attorney.32  Yet, repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers’ finan-
cial interests might be intertwined with one another through
formal joint-venture agreements that spell out funding coali-
tions, informal promises to distribute common-benefit work
and leadership positions to allies, and settlement provisions
that condition the deal on achieving a certain client participa-
tion rate.  While lawyers compete with one another for leader-
ship positions and clients, they may also play the long game to
maximize their mutual financial gains.33  So, the concern is
30 Studies have shown, for example, that repeat players have been more
successful in qui tam litigation, that attorneys who regularly appear before the
same appellate court have higher win rates than their opponents, and that judges
are more likely to vote against lawyers who lack experience before their court.
David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1258 (2012); Susan Brodie Haire et
al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decision Making in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 678, 681 (1999).
31 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt.
a, 1.05 illustrations 2, 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities
of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985,
1987–89 (2011).
32 See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30
(1988); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries,
85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1639 (1999); Russell Korobkin & Chris Gutherie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV.
77, 82 (1997).
33 E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 41, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust
Litig., No. 13-md-2420 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Lithium Ion Batteries
Transcript] (“Guido and I collectively have probably over a hundred years of experi-
ence . . . I’ve known Mr. Cotchett for decades, as well as the group from Lieff
Cabraser.  I’ve worked with them in virtually every case, so has everybody.”).
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that repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers may be more loyal to each other
or even to defense attorneys than to their own clients.34
These issues do not occur in a vacuum; they take place
against a rich backdrop of legal developments and socially and
judicially constructed norms.  Accordingly, this Part explores
the legal context and leadership selection methodology, which
sets the table for understanding how a small group of repeat
players came to exert such a profound influence in aggregate
litigation.  It then considers those players’ competitive advan-
tages and the ways in which those advantages might serve or
disserve plaintiffs.
A. The Growth of Multidistrict Litigation and the Lack of
Formal Rules
Repeat players’ influence derives in part from the steady
use of multidistrict litigation to resolve mass harms as class-
certification standards become more stringent.  Corporations
operate on an increasingly nationwide and worldwide scale, yet
certifying a nationwide class action where state laws govern
has become less likely due to a series of congressional and
judicial decisions.  Congress and the appellate courts have
made certification more onerous by strengthening the com-
monality requirement,35 requiring plaintiffs to prove Rule 23’s
prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence,36 instructing
judges to delve into a case’s merits when the merits overlap
34 Galanter, supra note 25, at 24 (“The source of business generally counts R
for more than the client, especially where the client is unlikely to return or to send
in other clients.  The client is then expendable: he can be exploited to the full.”).
As plaintiff’s attorney Francis Scarpulla noted in supporting the “consensus”
group in the Lithium Ion Batteries litigation, “this group works collegially and
cooperatively with every single person sitting at that defense table.  I’ve known
some of them for 45 years, as long as I [sic] been practicing.  And I’ve probably
been lead counsel in more cases than anybody in this courtroom . . . .” Lithium Ion
Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 40. When the judge then asked the defend- R
ants’ counsel about objections to the proposed plaintiffs’ structure, Jim McGinnis
responded, “I [sic] been practicing here for almost 34 years, have known all of the
people on that side of the courtroom for most of those years, and I can tell you
with the utmost confidence that I’ve never had a problem with any one of them.”
Id. at 44.
35 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes strengthened the commonality standard
under Rule 23(a) and ensured that defendants could raise individual defenses,
which could inhibit Rule 23(b)(3) certification.  564 U.S. 338, 363–67 (2011).
36 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414
(2014); Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95
(2013) (internal citations excluded).
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with class-certification requirements,37 and complicating
choice-of-law and manageability questions through federal ju-
risdiction.38  Thus, it is unsurprising that past researchers
found an increasing number of personal-injury and product-
liability cases consolidated through multidistrict litigation, and
a decreasing number of class-certification motions.39
Stricter certification requirements present challenges for
the transferee judges who coordinate and manage multidistrict
cases.  While judges were often critiqued for their class-certifi-
cation opinions,40 Rule 23 set forth clear judicial authority to
appoint class counsel, ensure adequate representation, ap-
prove settlements, and award attorneys’ fees.  Plus, Rule 23(f)
built in appellate jurisdiction, providing a clear path to error
correction via interlocutory appeal.  Time and again, appellate
court judges overturned collusive deals that benefited the at-
torneys, but disserved class members.41
While plenary class certification has waned, claims of cor-
porate wrongdoing have not.  When those affected by corporate
misconduct want to sue, plaintiffs’ lawyers aggregate them
through advertising and referrals, using the sheer number of
people they represent to help defray litigation costs.  Plaintiffs
and their attorneys—many of whom who excelled in litigating
class actions—are then transferred and coordinated through
multidistrict litigation.42  This provides a forum with the same
high-stakes, but without the overt judicial monitoring and er-
ror-correction built into Rule 23.
This leaves a lot of potential for both innovation and mis-
chief.  The lack of clear policing power has left judges scram-
bling to fill the void with class-action analogies and equitable
37 See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194–95; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at
2551–52; In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307, No.
07–1689 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2008).
38 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat.
4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
39 See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidis-
trict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV.
775, 777 (2010).
40 E.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014).
41 E.g., id.; Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting
that the class action is “a worthwhile supplement to conventional litigation proce-
dure” but that it is controversial “in part because it is frequently abused”); Reyn-
olds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002).  Scholarship is likewise
rife with commentary on this concern. E.g., Erichson, supra note 22; Susan P. R
Koniak, Feasting While the Widows Weep: Georgene v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
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powers.43  Without standardization, ad hoc practices develop,
creating unpredictability and variation in key areas such as
leadership appointments, compensating lead lawyers (in both
practices and percentages), and endorsing or enforcing private
settlements.44  To avoid the coordination problems inherent in
communicating with many plaintiffs’ attorneys, judges appoint
leaders to shepherd the litigation and negotiate settlement.
When those leaders perform work above and beyond what they
would do for their own clients, they should be compensated.
But there is no uniform theoretical basis or metric for doing
so.45  Consequently, judges have tinkered with methodology
and common-benefit percentages, sometimes cutting individ-
ual attorneys’ fees along the way.46
This uncertainty over attorneys’ fees prompts lawyers to
experiment.  Lead lawyers are searching for—and finding—
ways to contract around judicial unpredictability via settle-
ment.  As we demonstrate, repeat attorneys with the most ex-
perience are more likely to be appointed to leadership
positions, and those in leadership design settlements.47  But
questions remain as to whether fee provisions in settlements
benefit the litigants themselves.  Without class certification,
aggregate settlements are private deals that do not undergo
Rule 23(e)’s vetting process to ensure that they are “fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate.”48
43 E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611
(E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); see
also Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 CIN. L. REV.
389, 389–91 (2012) (criticizing the use of “quasi-class action”).
44 E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557
(E.D. La. Aug 3, 2009) (“[T]he parties have done more than simply ask the Court to
approve a settlement agreement or move for a disbursement of funds.  In fact, this
Court is expressly authorized to be the Chief Administrator of the Settlement
Agreement.”); Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settle-
ments, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2013) (“Claims belong to claimants, not to
the judge.”); Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements,
42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123, 127–29 (2012).
45 Burch, supra note 20, at 101–08. R
46 E.g., In re Guidant, 2008 WL 682174 at *19 n.30; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 04-01596, 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (awarding costs
and lead lawyers’ fees off the top of the general settlement fund, then awarding
individual attorneys between 30 and 35%).  In Vioxx, however, the judge capped
all lawyers’ fees at 32% and then allocated 8% of that amount to lead lawyers.  In
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. Aug. 27,
2008).  This was later reduced.
47 Infra section II.C.2, Table 5.
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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Particular concerns arise in the aggregate settlement con-
text because plaintiffs’ claims and injuries can vary dramati-
cally; multidistrict litigation requires only a common question
of fact, not that common facts predominate as in a Rule 23(b)(3)
class.49  If tried in plaintiffs’ original fora, for a variety of rea-
sons related to jury pool, injury severity, the lack of genetic
predispositions, and even state laws, some plaintiffs would in-
evitably achieve awards much higher than those offered by an
aggregate settlement.50  Thus, because their claims or circum-
stances present unique issues that deviate from the majority,
some plaintiffs may experience suboptimal outcomes.51
It is here that nonclass cases can divege from class actions.
In Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, dissatisfied class members—par-
ticularly those with idiosyncratic or high-value claims—can opt
out.52  Competing attorneys exist to assist and even solicit
them in this endeavor.  When judges appoint class counsel and
certify a class, only class counsel stands to gain from the attor-
neys’ fees generated by the settlement.  This incentivizes a host
of lawyers who are otherwise ineligible for that fee award to
investigate and cherry pick class members with individually
marketable claims to opt out of the class regime.53
But the conditions in nonclass multidistrict litigation stifle
the competitive check that exists in class actions in two ways.
First, as the following section explains, the overwhelming mes-
sage sent by transferee judges is that leadership appoint-
ments—and the lucrative fees that accompany them—are
conditioned upon cooperation and team play.54  So, even
though plaintiffs’ attorneys are known to be an aggressive
group, their rational and calculated response may be to pub-
licly silence their discord and play the long game by climbing
the leadership ranks.  Second, there are more explicit reasons
that even one-shot plaintiffs’ attorneys do not buck.  As we
49 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (requiring “civil actions involving one
or more common questions of fact” as a predicate for multidistrict litigation), with
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring such common questions of fact to “predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members” if it is the basis of a class
action (emphasis added)).
50 The scholarly literature is rife with examples that we will not attempt to
replicate here.  The interested reader, however, might begin with these two
sources: NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCI-
DENTS (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of
the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003).
51 See Nagareda, supra note 50, at 164. R
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(v).
53 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 168–69. R
54 E.g., Hon. Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for
Multidistrict Litigation Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 393 (2014).
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demonstrate in this Article, settlements themselves can be de-
signed to force them to capitulate by tying their own financial
interests to defendants’ ability to achieve closure.55
B. Why Repeat Players are so Likely in Multidistrict
Litigations
To streamline and organize cases, transferee judges ap-
point a host of what we collectively term “lead lawyers”: lead
counsel, who head the litigation; steering and executive com-
mittees that make key decisions concerning litigation strategy
and settlement;56 liaison counsel, who disseminates informa-
tion to other attorneys, calls meetings, and coordinates with
counsel in related state (and sometimes bankruptcy) actions;
and occasionally separate committee chairs such as discovery
and trial committees.57
Repeat players are especially likely to occupy these leader-
ship positions for three reasons.  First, by encouraging private
ordering and consensus, judicial methods for selecting lead
lawyers favor those who have litigated multidistrict litigations
in the past.  Previous players know one another, have worked
together before, and are thus well positioned to take the helm.
Second, the judges appointing attorneys for leadership roles
stress attorneys’ cooperative tendencies, which advantages
lawyers with pre-existing relationships who have a track record
of working well together.  Finally, while all civil litigation tends
to result in settlement over trial, the emphasis on settlement
within multidistrict proceedings is especially pronounced.
With less than three percent of cases ever returning to their
court of origin and a persistent stigma of “remand-as-failure,”58
transferee judges have a strong desire to settle these cases.
This suggests a need to select attorneys with experience set-
tling complex matters over those who are relatively inexperi-
enced.  As discussed below, these three factors create fertile
conditions for repeat play.
55 Infra section III.B.1.
56 Judges occasionally appoint a specific “negotiating committee,” but lead
counsel along with the steering or executive committee typically conduct settle-
ment negotiations.
57 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
58 Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 144
(2013). See also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation,
75 LA. L. REV. 399, 417–18 (2014) (explaining a host of factors that make settle-
ment particularly attractive to transferee judges).
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1. Lead Lawyer Selection Methods
It is often impossible to determine precisely how judges
select leaders.  Attorney applications are rarely found on judi-
cial dockets, judges tend not to be explicit about their actual
methodology, and the attorneys’ internal coordination efforts
may ultimately dictate the slate.59  For example, judges may
conduct an open application process, but may be given a
choice between two competing consensus slates or may simply
select the attorney with the most consensus support.
Still, judges typically use one of three methods: consensus
methods, competitive selection, and a hybrid of those options.
First, the consensus method relies on informal attorney net-
works to identify necessary leadership positions and select
their own leaders; the judge then confirms the proposed
slate.60  Second, the hybrid process allows temporary, “interim”
lead counsel to apply, nominate liaison counsel and executive
committee members, and appoint sub-committee members
while simultaneously permitting an open application pro-
cess.61  As one objector in the General Motors Ignition Switch
litigation noted, however, this process “empowers [temporary
lead counsel] to handpick the majority of the Executive Com-
mittee” and leaves only a few positions “open to a transparent
application process.”62  Third, judges might implement com-
petitive selection where the court invites submissions and
59 E.g., CAROLYN A. DUBAY, TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN THE APPOINTMENT AND COM-
PENSATION OF COMMON BENEFIT COUNSEL IN COMPLEX MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TEN MEGA MDLS 32–33, Tbl. 3  (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors) (identifying the procedures for appointing plaintiffs’
leadership that varied substantially in levels of generality and observing “while the
court may initially dictate a competition, consensus, or hybrid approach, ulti-
mately the actions of the attorneys themselves will dictate the level of cooperation
in the development of a leadership slate”).
60 E.g., In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pract. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1629 (D.
Mass. Dec. 14, 2004) (order granting motion to appoint counsel) (appointing
plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed slate); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 1811
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2007) (appointing leadership counsel and observing that the
group “most closely meets the ‘private ordering’ concept, because it has support of
the larger number of plaintiffs and lawyers involved”). The first Manual for Com-
plex Litigation recommended this approach, though it changed course by the
second edition and advised judges to oversee the appointment process. Compare
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92, 4.53 (1982), with MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 20.224 (1985). Informal selection methods vary and
may simply be based on a vote of attorneys invited to a particular meeting.
61 Letter to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Aaron S. Podhurst and Harley S.
Tropin at 2, In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).
62 Letter to Judge Jesse M. Furman from Steve W. Berman, Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, and Mark P. Robinson, Jr. at 2, In re General Motors LLC Ignition
Switch Litig., No. 14-md-02543 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).
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chooses among them.  Judges might leave the vetting to special
masters and law clerks, then treat the final selection as a con-
firmation hearing of sorts.63
In these latter two methods, judges sometimes permit com-
peting attorneys to object to proposed nominees.  Attorneys
who work together frequently are likely to have superior infor-
mation about one another’s skills and temperament.  Thus,
allowing objections can impart valuable vetting information to
judges and special masters.  But repeat players may reveal that
information only if solicited privately.  When judges require at-
torneys to serve their objections on all counsel,64 or solicit ob-
jections in open court,65 they are unlikely to receive candid
feedback.  The conditions are ripe for conformity and informa-
tion cascades: the relevant plaintiffs’ bar is small, lead lawyers
can influence and sometimes directly control one another’s at-
torneys’ fees, lawyers must often rely on each other to form
funding coalitions, and, as explained below, being dubbed “un-
cooperative” may render defectors ineligible for future leader-
ship roles.66
2. Emphasis on Factors that Favor Repeat Players
When judges consider applicants for leadership positions,
they focus on experience, cooperative tendencies, and an abil-
ity to finance the litigation67—factors that favor repeat players.
63 E.g., Special Master’s Rule 23 Report Recommending Interim Plaintiff
Leadership Counsel, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-
20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2013).
64 E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-2179, slip op. at 14 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial
order no. 1) (setting initial conference).
65 E.g., Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 1–28. R
66 See Infra subpart IV.B; see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 28–29 (2003) (discussing the role of group identification and conformity);
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 170–74 (discussing the role of sanctions
for objectors/defectors in close-knit groups who aim to maximize their own wel-
fare).  But see Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 49 (claiming that R
if selected, the consensus group would not exclude objectors from receiving work).
67 Dubay, supra note 59, at 39–40, Tbl. 6 (“[T]he courts with specific orders as R
to qualifications focused on experience in MDLs or complex litigation and the
ability and resources to commit to the leadership responsibilities.”). E.g., In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010,
No. 10-2179, slip op. at 13–14 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1)
(setting initial conference); In re Boston Sci. Corp., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2326, at 9 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (pretrial order no. 1) (“The main
criteria for PSC membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a
time-consuming project; (b) ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) pro-
fessional experience in this type of litigation.”); Duval, supra note 54, at 393 R
(listing “team players,” “expertise,” and “financial considerations” as factors in
selecting leadership).
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To gauge these criteria, judges often request short four to five
page submissions, and call other judges to ask about disrup-
tive attorneys.68  Even attorneys’ submissions sometimes sug-
gest a litany of judges who can vouch for the applicant’s
reputation and “proven ability to work well with others.”69
When writing about selection criteria, the judge who presided
over the Hurricane Katrina litigation listed “team players” as
“the primary factor in choosing lead counsel, liaison counsel,
or even membership on a steering committee.”70
In the abstract, experience and cooperation seem like posi-
tive attributes.  And experience in building the relevant infra-
structure to litigate claims is critical.  But in reality,
emphasizing cooperation can lead to three negative effects that
may dampen the advantage that experience confers.  First, it
may foster a need for attorneys to curry favor with one another
to secure lucrative positions in future leadership hierarchies.
Second, it deters dissent by implicitly labeling it as something
that should not be rewarded.  Yet, dissent can be particularly
important during settlement.
The lack of dissent prompts a third concern over adequate
representation.71  Because multidistrict litigation’s authorizing
statute requires that cases share only a single common ques-
tion of fact,72 claimants’ best interests are unlikely to be uni-
68 E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico,
on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-2179, slip op. at 14 (E.D. La. 2010) (pretrial order no. 1)
(setting initial conference); Transcript of Proceedings on November 16, 2012 at
16–17, In re Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-
2391 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2012) (“I know most of the judges who have your MDLs,
and so I emailed them this week, gave the list of names that had been submitted,
and said, ‘Tell me anybody who [sic] I should not appoint.’”).
69 Plaintiffs’ Proposed Counsel Organizational Structure at 12, 25–26, In re
Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind.
Nov. 16, 2012) (leadership applications of Mark Lanier and Douglass Kreis); see
also Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 25–26 (“[O]ur firm was R
specifically commended by both the special master and [the court] for the role we
played.  And I submitted the order of special master Martin Quinn where he said
that we did a superb job in many important aspects of the case.”).
70 Duval, supra note 54, at 393. R
71 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997); Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); Burch, supra note 20, at 87–91 (arguing R
that adequate representation concerns extend to multidistrict litigation); Eliza-
beth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
132–33, 144 (2017) (contending that Due Process protections apply to nonclass
aggregation). Monopolies in Multidistict Litigation is a solo-authored companion
piece that offers normative insights based on this Article’s empirical and network
analysis.
72 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). See Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Proce-
dural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 141 (2015) (“The dangers of MDL from the
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form.  And the claimants most likely to be disserved by
nonclass multidistrict litigation—and thus most in need of dis-
sent on their behalf—are those with unique or high-value
claims.  As Professor Richard Nagareda elaborated in the class
context, “[M]embers with high-value claims are the ones most
at risk from the sale of claims en masse by class counsel as
monopolist.  The greater the variance in claim value, the more
fervent the effort at variance reduction through the embrace of
a class settlement that dampens the prospect for variance at
the high end of the damage scale . . . .”73  The same logic holds
true when multidistrict proceedings are resolved through
mass—though not class—settlement, as is the case for most
product liability and sales practice proceedings.74  But incen-
tives to dissent are weaker.
Unlike class actions, where the defendant has reason to
raise conflicting interests when battling class certification, the
controlling stakeholders in nonclass multidistrict litigation—
plaintiffs’ lead lawyers, defendants, and their attorneys—have
little economic motive to raise conflicts.  Lead lawyers have two
income sources: contingent fees from their own clients and
court ordered “taxes” from plaintiffs (and their individual coun-
sel) who benefit from leaders’ efforts.  Attorneys profit from rep-
resenting as many people as possible—not from recognizing
divisive interests.  And defendants’ closure hinges not on the
preclusive effect of a class-wide settlement that demands ade-
quate representation, but on convincing claimants to accept a
settlement offer.  Consequently, judicial pressure toward coop-
eration and consensus may erode dissent and the adequate
representation that follows from it.
3. Settlement Pressure
As is the case nationwide, in multidistrict proceedings
there are far more claims than an individual judge can try in
full.75  As the proceedings in our database illustrate, this cre-
ates systemic pressure to settle that is exacerbated by the con-
tinued control that key stakeholders can exert through
centralization and the transferee judges’ reluctance to remand
perspective of the paternalism model are exacerbated by the extremely loose con-
nection required among the claims.”).
73 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 167 (footnote omitted).  This logic holds in R
multidistrict litigation as well.
74 See infra Figure 1 (providing an overview of how courts resolved the prod-
ucts-liability and sales-practices multidistrict proceedings within our dataset).
75 Galanter, supra note 25, at 25. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt unknown Seq: 20 29-SEP-17 12:56
1464 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1445
cases.76  As of May 11, 2016, of the seventy-three multidistrict
product-liability and sales-practice proceedings that were
pending as of May 2013, parties settled thirty-one proceedings
through holistic aggregate or inventory settlements, twenty
through class-action settlements, one through individual set-
tlements, and one through bankruptcy.77  Defendants success-
fully used Daubert motions, summary judgment, and
arbitration to resolve ten proceedings, and the remaining ten
proceedings are still ongoing.
FIGURE 1: RESOLUTIONS WITHIN THE DATASET OF MULTIDISTRICT


















Settlement shields practices and emerging “rules” from ap-
pellate review, making change and disruption less likely.78
Settlement likewise allows repeat players to expand their power
beyond the federal court’s jurisdiction.  As transferee judges
recognize their limited authority to command parallel litigation
in state courts—at least beyond informal coordination—repeat
players may seize the opportunity to benefit from fees in com-
peting state cases through settlement design.79  As lead law-
yers who liaise with state counsel and bargain with the
defendant, they hold substantial power to negotiate master set-
76 See Burch, supra note 58, at 410–20; Redish & Karaba, supra note 72, at R
128–29.
77 Table A1 in the appendix includes the proceedings’ consolidation dates.
78 Galanter, supra note 25, at 26. R
79 E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir.
2014).  The judge has now certified a class composed of those lead lawyers, other
law firms, and clients who paid for common-benefit services and expenses that is
suing objectors for unjust enrichment and quantum-meruit claims.  Downing v.
Goldman Phipps PLLC, 2015 WL 4255342 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015).
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tlement agreements that require settling plaintiffs to consent to
common-benefit fees.80
Table 1 below summarizes the ways in which repeat play-
ers gain the upper hand in multidistrict litigation, highlights
opportunities for norms to enter the picture, and notes judicial
deference to emerging practices and claims handling.
TABLE 1: REPEAT PLAYER ADVANTAGES
Extra-legal norm
Institutional and rule entrenchment and Additional
Goals entrenchment enforcement advantages
Defendants Avoid liability Legislation and Ability to negotiate for Specialized
and their Achieve cost- centralization pools plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees expertise
attorneys effective cases and creates a Settlement offer
finality across single bargaining unit withdrawal as a sanction
state and (§ 1407, CAFA) on uncooperative
federal courts Transferee judges’ plaintiffs’ attorneys
reluctance to remand (withdrawal provisions
Judges cannot fully in settlement)
litigate every case
Little appellate review
Plaintiffs’ Bargaining Judges’ leadership Cooperative norms Specialized
lead lawyers credibility selection criteria favor Reciprocity concerns expertise and
Attorneys’ fees repeat players Negotiating and work- experience
(from clients Centralization creates distribution authority Some judicial
and leadership structure for group deference to
leadership (§ 1407(a)) Ability to socially and claims
roles) Judges cannot fully financially sanction non- handling
Future litigate each case cooperative plaintiffs’ Ability to





C. Costs and Benefits of Repeat Play—Why This Matters
As Table 1 illustrates, multidistrict litigations are ripe not
only for repeat players to influence, create, and change the
standard practices—“rules,” for short—that occur within them,
but also to entrench those rules.  First, appellate oversight is
rare.  Cases often conclude through private settlements that
are not appealable;81 interim rulings, such as those appointing
lead lawyers or creating common-benefit funds, are not dispos-
itive and are reviewable only through an extraordinary writ of
mandamus or subsequent dismissal;82 and, in the unlikely
event of appellate review, courts use the deferential abuse-of-
80 See infra section III.B.2.
81 Some judges have expressly waived parties’ ability to appeal through their
common-benefit fund participation agreement. E.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (Pretrial Order
No. 54, at 5–6).
82 See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 207 (1999); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376–78 (1981); Redish & Karaba,
supra note 72, at 142. R
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discretion standard.83  Second, because formal, hard-and-fast
rules are scarce, transferee judges tend to look to their prede-
cessors and peers for guidance.84  Without much external scru-
tiny, past practices may become best practices and experienced
repeat players could cite, replicate, and improve upon proce-
dures that benefitted them while discarding those that did not.
Repeat players can shape leadership appointments in at
least three ways.  First, the consensus-selection method (and
even methods where the judge formally selects but defers to
private ordering) allows repeat players to proffer a preordained
leadership slate.85  Second, even if the transferee judge em-
ploys a competitive-selection process for key positions like lead
and liaison counsel as well as the steering committee, chosen
leaders can then select attorneys to perform the work or serve
on sub-committees, like a discovery committee.  Third, in open-
selection or hybrid-selection methods, repeat players may
vouch for one another’s cooperative abilities, providing a cho-
rus of support—either in writing or in open court—for the unof-
ficial consensus nominees.86
Once appointed, leaders can likewise work to maximize
their common-benefit fees.  Because there is no firm doctrinal
ground to guide judges in awarding these fees,87 ample oppor-
tunities exist for lead lawyers to influence their compensation.
First, judges often implement leaders’ proposed common-bene-
fit orders, and defer to leaders’ requests to raise fees during the
proceeding.88  Second, in some multidistrict proceedings,
judges may create a fee-allocation committee comprised of the
83 E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. Appx. 391 (5th
Cir. July 16, 2010) (using the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the alle-
gation that the judge should have recused himself based on his dual roles as
judge and Chief Administrator of the Master Settlement Agreement).
84 For example, the opinions in Zyprexa heavily influenced the oversight of
Guidant and Vioxx. E.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 650 F. Supp. 2d
549, 560 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1657, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05–1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *17–18 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
85 For example, in the Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litigation, when plain-
tiffs’ attorneys could not reach a complete consensus as to who would represent
the indirect purchasers before the court’s hearing, Dan Becnel noted, “I tried to—
when we came down here to—to have three [lead counsel], make a deal, and—and
Mr. Berman decided not to. So the bulk of us think Mr. Cotchett and the Cabraser
firm are excellent.” Lithium Ion Batteries Transcript, supra note 33, at 51. R
86 E.g., id. at 59 (“And we are also supporting the Cotchett, Lieff motion, but
we are glad to work with all three firms.”).
87 See Burch, supra note 20, at 102–09. R
88 See Dubay, supra note 59, at 22–23, 54–55; infra notes 239–242 and R
accompanying text.
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principal lead lawyers.89  This means that at any given time,
lawyers could pressure other attorneys through their influence
over fees in concurrent multidistrict proceedings.  Third, repeat
players may understand—and perpetuate—norms about
which kind of work is most beneficial (and thus most deserving
of enhanced compensation), perform that work themselves,
and delegate less profitable tasks to others.90  Finally, as the
settlement designers, lead lawyers could insert fee provisions
into settlements, negotiate their fees directly with the defen-
dant, and contract around judicial fee orders to tax settling
state-court plaintiffs via master settlement agreements.91
To be sure, repeat play can generate positive effects, too.
First, repeat players capitalize on economies of scale and their
acquired knowledge is imperative.  It takes expertise to compre-
hend the science behind injuries, understand the risks of vari-
ous litigation strategies, build the infrastructure that
accompanies a multidistrict proceeding, and manage litigation
effectively.92
Second, repeat actors are intimately familiar with the myr-
iad layers of administrative service providers who work behind
the scenes from claim initiation to resolution, but may renege
on their price structuring and deliverables.  These providers
range from client-intake call centers and client-referral services
that promise to deliver client leads through advertising93 to
89 E.g., In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2015) (case management order no.
71) (creating a fee committee with five of eight members appointed by co-lead and
liaison counsel).
90 E.g., Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Alloca-
tion and Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 13–14, In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014) (discuss-
ing the novelty and difficulty of the questions addressed by counsel and the skill
requisite to perform the legal work as factors used to distribute fees).  Kristine
Kraft, Paul Rheingold, Steven Blau, and Roger Denton were appointed as lead
counsel in NuvaRing. In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 8, 2008) (order appointing lead lawyers).  Combined, their three firms
netted $7.4 million of a total $10,123,395.00 of fees awarded to ten total firms.
Kraft and Denton’s firm, Schlicter, Bogard & Denton LLP received $6.9 million of
the $7.4 million.  Exhibit 1 to Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Re-
garding the Allocation and Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at
13–14, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16,
2014).
91 See infra subsection III.C.2.b.
92 Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 28, 2015
(quoting Richard Arsenault as saying, “A lot of deference should be given to
experienced plaintiffs’ counsel who have been in these wars and understand what
kinds of teams they need to put together.”).
93 E.g., GACOVINO LAKE [https://perma.cc/Z58W-VDE7];THE SENTINEL GROUP
[https://perma.cc/GZB9-8Y8R]; RELION-GROUP [https://perma.cc/2E5T-397E].
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marketing firms,94 document repositories, and claims adminis-
trators.95  In this way, multidistrict litigation is merely one
facet of a broad network of stakeholders.96  Because there is
little direct judicial oversight and regulation, particularly with
regard to pricing document databases and claims administra-
tion, repeat play incentivizes providers to follow through on
their commitments.  Yet, this also creates opportunities for ser-
vice providers to conspire with repeat players in ways that dis-
serve plaintiffs.
Third, when repeat players get involved in a multidistrict
litigation, it signals to other plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants
that it’s a high-stakes case.  Certain firms are known to inten-
sively vet cases with experts long before filing a complaint.
Consequently, their reputation may encourage others to adver-
tise and recruit clients, and prompt cases to settle more quickly
than they otherwise might.  Those settlement values may like-
wise reflect repeat players’ knowledge about previous awards,
which helps prevent defendants from using information asym-
metries to their advantage.97
Finally, attorneys who have worked together closely in the
past will know more about one another’s work habits and ex-
pertise than the judge.  As lawyers form leadership groups for a
particular case, they might design their team to maximize one
another’s strengths.  Moreover, because they work together fre-
quently, repeat players can use social and financial sanctions
to enforce norms and promote efficiency beyond simplistic effi-
ciencies such as avoiding duplicative discovery and pre-trial
motions.  For example, it makes sense to ostracize disorganized
attorneys with poor work product, those who are inefficient
time-managers with inflated billable hours, and those who can-
not complete assignments on time.  Yet, reciprocal relation-
ships might likewise mean that attorneys who would otherwise
94 E.g., CONSUMER ATTORNEY MARKETING GROUP [https://perma.cc/3LWK-
EK3M]; ILAWYERMARKETING [https://perma.cc/23YG-EVSB].
95 E.g., BROWNGREER [https://perma.cc/2CM5-2RLR]; Garretson, [https://
perma.cc/7GB9-VT6X]; Providio [https://perma.cc/M7GH-EATM]; RUST CONSULT-
ING [https://perma.cc/Q8X5-4YMK].
96 See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 123–24 (noting that any set of nodes in R
network theory inevitably has real-life ties to other nodes that affect the network
and the flow).
97 See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571,
1581–84, 1599–1600 (2004).
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be excluded for their various failings may nevertheless remain
if lead or liaison counsel is indebted to them.98
Given the degree of specialization and success required to
fund firms’ capital contributions in multidistrict litigation, this
segment of the plaintiffs’ bar is relatively small; reciprocal rela-
tionships form, and an attorney’s reputation matters im-
mensely.  Playing the long game may not only allow repeat
players to play for rules and reap the advantages those rules
provide, but also empower those attorneys to influence and
control group dynamics in ways that could impinge on client
representation.99
Accordingly, whether the positive gains outweigh the po-
tential negatives remains to be seen.100  Because repeat players
have so much control with so few external safeguards and so
little incentive to draw attention to deals that may not favor
litigants over lawyers, there is a pressing need to examine both
who repeat players are and the deals they design.  Conse-
quently, we turn now to those tasks using a dataset of repeat
players in products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict
litigation.
II
EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING REPEAT PLAY:
THE SOCIAL NETWORK
Before we can analyze repeat players’ impact, we must first
determine whether and the degree to which they exist.  Our
previous work suggests that they do,101 but the data in this
Article offer some benefits not provided by past work, which
focused solely on plaintiffs’ attorneys.  We not only include
plaintiffs’ lawyers in our network, but incorporate defense at-
torneys and law firms as well, which provides a more complete
picture of repeat play.  Additionally, this Article does not just
focus on who appears most often; it also examines their leader-
98 Scholars have consistently claimed that social factors, and not necessarily
expertise, may influence organizations and institutions. E.g., Katz & Stafford,
supra note 16, at 459. R
99 Inadequate representation can raise due process concerns. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 45 (1940); Burch, supra note 20, at 87–91 (arguing that adequate representa- R
tion concerns extend to multidistrict litigation); Burch, supra note 71, at 132–33, R
144 (contending that Due Process protections apply to nonclass aggregation);
Redish & Karaba, supra note 72, at 151. R
100 For an important perspective that efficiency should not outweigh Constitu-
tional due process protections such as adequate representation, see Redish &
Karaba, supra note 72, at 146–51. R
101 Burch, supra note 20, at 95–101; Williams et al., supra note 20, at 141. R
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ship positions, which helps gauge the participation and influ-
ence levels that allow attorneys to control litigation and shape
settlements.  After establishing who is in the repeat-player net-
work, we then analyze the publicly available nonclass settle-
ments that these leaders create.
A. Data Description and Sample Selection
To achieve some sense of how prevalent repeat players (in-
dividual attorneys and law firms) are in multidistrict litigation,
we built an original dataset that includes all judicially ap-
pointed lead plaintiff and defense lawyers in all products-liabil-
ity and sales-practices multidistrict litigations pending as of
May 14, 2013.  This date allows us to examine an array of
resulting settlements.102  A list of these 73 proceedings appears
in Appendix A1; collectively the proceedings include approxi-
mately 312,555 actions.
If repeat players exist, these proceedings should provide a
representative sample for several reasons.  First, products lia-
bility and sales practices constitute well over one-third of all
multidistrict proceedings—the largest segment by far.103  And
looking beyond the simple count of multidistrict proceedings to
the actual number of actions contained in each shows that
products liability comprise up to 92% of all those pending ac-
tions.104  Second, examining pending cases on a certain date
includes data from cases centralized over a twenty-two-year
102 We identified the relevant proceedings using the Panel’s list of pending
multidistrict litigations as of May 14, 2013.  Because the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill proceeding dealt with issues similar to products liability, such as physical
harm and economic loss, we also included it.  One case mentioned on that May
14, 2013 list was excluded because the orders were not electronically available (In
re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., which began in 2000).
Only interim counsel appointments were available in In re Plavix Marketing, Sales
Practices and Products Liability Litigation and In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid
Brake Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation.  Finally, we
included five separate multidistrict litigations over pelvic-repair systems trans-
ferred to the Southern District of West Virginia.  The transferee judge named the
same 62 attorneys as lead lawyers in four of those five cases.  Coding those four
litigations as one would reduce the percentage of repeat play: repeat attorneys
would hold 54.9% of all lead-lawyer positions and repeat law firms would occupy
73.2% of the available positions.  Because the Panel could have created one large
multidistrict case, but chose not to do so, we treat these five proceedings
separately.
103 CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIS-
TRICT LITIGATION 12 (2012) (showing 34 sales practices multidistrict litigations and
72 products liability litigations out of 291 total multidistrict litigations).
104 Samuel Issacharoff, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics 3, DUKE LAW CTR.
FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES (2015), https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/
october2015/materials/ [https://perma.cc/8ZMQ-RYUR].
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span.105  Third, to the extent possible, we included data from
all orders appointing lead lawyers (plaintiffs’ steering commit-
tees, plaintiffs’ liaison committees, discovery committees, trial
committees, defendant’s lead counsel, etc.), not just lead coun-
sel.  While lead counsel has the most power in any proceeding,
the additional steering or executive committee members follow
them closely.  Once lead lawyers negotiate a master settlement,
liaison counsel also plays a vital role in marketing the deal to
individual lawyers both inside and outside the multidistrict
proceeding—including those attorneys litigating solely in state
courts.  When taken as a whole, this information should give
an accurate sense of the scale of repeat play.
Our data confirmed that repeat players populate most mul-
tidistrict leadership positions.  On the plaintiffs’ side, repeat
players (attorneys who held more than one leadership position
within our dataset) held 767 out of 1,221 available leadership
roles, or 62.8%.  Fifty attorneys were named as lead lawyers in
five or more multidistrict litigations and those 50 attorneys
occupied 30% of all plaintiff-side leadership positions.106  A full
list of those attorneys appears in Appendix A2, and a partial list
of the top 25 high-level players appears subsequently in Table
3.  Repeat play among plaintiffs’ law firms was even more evi-
dent.  Again, even though only 40.7% of law firms were repeat
players (i.e., had more than one lawyer from that firm ap-
pointed to a leadership position within the dataset), lawyers
from those 70 firms occupied 78% of all available leadership
positions.107  Seventy law firms had attorneys who were named
to five or more leadership roles, and attorneys from those firms
were appointed to well over half of all lead-lawyer positions.
Put starkly, 16% of the involved law firms held nearly 54% of all
leadership positions.  Appendix A3 contains a list of plaintiffs’-
side repeat-player law firms with the greatest number of
appearances.
On the defense side, repeat players held 73 of 414 leader-
ship positions, or 17.6%.  Of course, defense lawyers are rarely
105 As noted in footnote 102, one older case was excluded because the orders R
were not available electronically, but In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation,
which began in 1991, is included.
106 This statistic does not count lawyers who occupied multiple leadership
positions within the same multidistrict litigation.
107 Two judges named entire law firms as lead or liaison counsel.  Where
possible, only the attorneys from the named law firm who were “to be notified by
the court” on PACER were included in the data.  The number of available leader-
ship positions from the law firm perspective was 1,222, and lawyers from firms
named more than once occupied 957 of those leadership positions.
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judicially appointed to leadership positions; the defendant
hires the law firm directly and different partners may spear-
head distinct matters.  So, evidence of repeat play by those
attorneys’ law firms was more indicative for defendants: of the
414 available leadership positions, attorneys from repeat-
player defense firms occupied 341, or 82.3%, of those leader-
ship roles.  The 19 defense firms whose attorneys occupied five
or more leadership positions claimed 41.5% of those roles.  A
list of defense-side repeat-player law firms with the greatest
number of appearances appears subsequently in Table 4.
While this Article focuses on nonclass proceedings, infor-
mation on repeat play in class-action settlements occurring
within multidistrict proceedings nevertheless provides some
useful comparisons.  Class actions tended to have fewer leader-
ship positions, ranging from 22 at the high end to 4 at the low
end, and averaging 11.5 positions per proceeding, 43.9% of
which were filled with repeat players.  By contrast, plaintiffs’
leadership positions in nonclass cases ranged from 62 in the
pelvic-mesh cases (American Medical Systems, Ethicon, Boston
Scientific, and C.R. Bard) at the high end to 3 positions
(Coloplast and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup) or 1 firm (Mirapex) at
the low end.108  Nonclass multidistrict litigations averaged 21.9
positions per proceeding, 75.2% of which were filled with re-
peat players.  Excluding the unusually high number of pelvic-
mesh appointments (in American Medical Systems, Ethicon,
Boston Scientific, and C.R. Bard) lowers the average number of
positions to 15.9, with repeat players occupying 61%.  More
detailed information on the level of repeat play by proceeding
appears subsequently in Table 5.
B. The Network Methodology
We used a social network analysis to depict the connec-
tions between lawyers and multidistrict proceedings. Network
analysis has long been used to study relationships between
leaders such as judges and corporate board members.109  Not
only does graphing the network demonstrate if there are inter-
108 The New England Compounding litigation was excluded from these calcu-
lations given its unique bankruptcy status.
109 See Katz & Stafford, supra note 16, at 457; Garry Robins & Malcolm Alex- R
ander, Small Worlds Among Interlocking Directors: Network Structure and Distance
in Bipartite Graphs, 10 COMPUTATIONAL & MATHEMATICAL ORG. THEORY 69, 74 (2004).
This work builds on the early contributions of Jacob Moreno, who pioneered
networks analysis’s use in diagramming social relationships between individuals
holding leadership positions. JACOB L. MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? A NEW AP-
PROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN INTERRELATIONS 86, 153 (1934).
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connections within data (or not), the graphs can highlight the
relative importance of a set of entities to the larger group, such
as particular multidistrict proceedings or attorneys within
those proceedings.110
Accordingly, we built an adjacency matrix and employed a
two-mode (actors and events) projection of a bipartite network,
also known as an affiliation network, to graph the ties between
lawyers judicially appointed to leadership positions (the actors)
in multidistrict proceedings (the events).111  Bipartite networks
avoid the loss-of-information problems sometimes associated
with converting an affiliation matrix to one-mode data.112  As
corporate boards do for corporations, lead lawyers make the
full range of pretrial litigation decisions for all of the plaintiffs
within the group and, because leaders are judicially appointed,
we know exactly who is and is not a member, which gives the
network clear boundaries (also known as edges).113
While we cannot identify friendship, cooperation, or even
contrarians by looking directly at the actors, we can look at
agents’ ties to one another and generate hypotheses about their
influence on both social connections and legal norms.114  For
example, our network graphs formal affiliations based on lead-
ership appointments, but friendships, joint ventures, and rival-
ries may contribute to or result from these formal
appointments.115  While some social network studies antici-
pate linkages and hierarchies,116 we make no such assump-
tions about the structure of leaders at the outset.  Instead, by
looking at statistical measures of degree centrality (the number
of connections a node—attorney or proceeding—makes),
betweenness centrality (how often a node is on a path between
two other nodes), and eigen values (how close one powerful
node is to another), we can begin to understand how the net-
work formed, and who is most important within it.  From there
110 DAVID KNOKE & JAMES H. KUKLINSKI, NETWORK ANALYSIS 50–59 (1982).
111 See M. E. J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45
SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS REV. 167, 174, 204 (2003) (discussing the
use of bipartite graphs for mapping social networks).
112 See STEPHEN P. BORGATTI ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL NETWORKS 239 (2013).
113 See Robins & Alexander, supra note 109, at 74. R
114 See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 232 (“In analyzing two-mode data, R
we typically [assume] that attending the same event is either an indicator of an
underlying social relationship between the actors or a potential opportunity for
one to develop.”).
115 See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 122–23. R
116 E.g., Salmon A. Shomade & Roger E. Hartley, The Application of Network
Analysis to the Study of Trial Courts, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 144 (2010) (anticipating
linkages between groups from courts’ unification plans).
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we can formulate and explore hypotheses about control, influ-
ence, and power as well as theoretical propositions about infor-
mation flow, norm development, and norm entrenchment.117
We provide an overview of network terminology below in Table
2.118
TABLE 2: SOCIAL NETWORK TERMINOLOGY
Social
network term Applied definition
Node An attorney or multidistrict proceeding in the network
Centrality The position of a node (attorney or proceeding) in the network;
more central nodes have more potential to influence others, act as
gatekeepers, and receive “flows” such as information or financial
support; central actors tend to have more social capital
Degree Indicates how many ties one attorney or proceeding has to other
centrality attorneys or proceedings within the data; nodes with high degree
centrality tend to be those that insiders might flag as integral to
complex proceedings
Betweenness Indicates how often a node is on the shortest path to other nodes
centrality (think of a bridge, for example); nodes with high betweenness
centrality tend to have a high potential for gatekeeping or toll-
taking and have power because they can filter, distort, or threaten
to stop transmitting information
Eigen value Indicates how close one node is to other well-connected nodes;
centrality nodes with high eigen values tend to indicate popularity—they
connect to well-connected others
In the context of multidistrict proceedings, these network
insights are especially important.  As other studies have
shown, attorneys in multidistrict litigation are repeat
players.119  The more often they appear in proceedings, the
more likely they are to be appointed to leadership positions,
and being in leadership means having the opportunity to play
for rules.  As we discussed in subpart I.C, the same attorneys
appearing in multiple proceedings could have advantages and
disadvantages.  Leadership consistency offers a number of
benefits, both to the litigants who rely on experienced repeat
players to win their case and net a high reward, and to judges
who may have handled few, if any, multidistrict proceedings
and perceive the attorneys as a reliable source of case-
management information.
Of course, repeat players’ informational advantage may
also have a downside: less high-profile attorneys who have
extensive experience in the trenches of discovery committees
117 See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 164. R
118 This table uses information from BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at R
163–75, to summarize definitional concepts.
119 Burch, supra note 20, at 96–97; Nagareda, supra note 50, at 141. R
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are closed out of opportunities to gain leadership experience,
leaders’ perspectives and heuristics may be less diverse, and,
even when privy to unique information that others lack,
attorneys may not share it for fear the dominant group member
will disapprove.120  Such dissent might be particularly useful
in both ensuring adequate representation for “outliers”
(plaintiffs with idiosyncratic injuries or circumstances) and for
the group as a whole.
Knowing what the network looks like and who is key within
it provides additional information to researchers examining the
role of attorneys in multidistrict litigation.  Before we delve into
the network, however, a word of caution is in order.  While our
list of products-liability proceedings contains a substantial
number of the cases centralized by the Panel as well as a
substantial number of the attorneys in those proceedings, it is
not exhaustive.  Without a complete list of all proceedings, it is
difficult to speculate about how important specific attorneys or
litigations are to the entire world of complex litigation.  As
such, our discussion focuses on the importance of attorneys
and proceedings in the network created with our data.  The
scope of the data suggests that the results are generalizable
outside the realm of products liability (and indeed the results
below are consistent with past work), but we cannot say with
certainty that what we find is true across all proceeding types,
or even for all products-liability cases for all time.  Nonetheless,
the importance of products-liability proceedings to the larger
world of civil litigation suggests this is an appropriate starting
place to examine attorneys’ relationships as well as their
influence.
C. Results
1. The Social Network
Using our database of 73 products-liability and sales-prac-
tices multidistrict litigations, we graphed the network among
the participating lead lawyers.  Our data include plaintiff and
defense attorneys, the leadership roles they held, how many
total appearances they make in the data, the size of the pro-
ceeding, and how many appearances the attorney’s firm made.
While snapshots of each of our graphs appear below, readers
interested in a searchable, magnified view of the labels (which
indicate individual attorneys and proceedings) in the network
120 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE
28–29 (2009); Burch, supra note 20, at 98–101. R
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can download the original images.121  Our look at the connec-
tions among attorneys is purely exploratory.  Graphing the net-
work among entities provides insights into data that cannot be
seen in thousands of rows; it shows us what’s hidden in plain
sight.  Still, our work is meant to generate hypotheses, not to
test them per se.
FIGURE 2: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-
PRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS
The network created among lead products-liability lawyers
in our data is quite cohesive.  As Figure 2 above shows, there is
a single densely populated network, and two much smaller
isolated networks on the periphery.  The smaller networks in-
clude litigation over Porsche’s plastic coolant tubes122 and the
121 Downloadable and searchable graphs are available under the “multidistrict
litigation” category at https://perma.cc/CB 2X-VWG4.
122 In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 11-md-2233 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
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Factor VII or IX blood products litigation.123  These two litiga-
tions do not share any leadership counsel common to the rest
of the larger network.  Unlike many other proceedings in our
data, the blood products litigation involved only three lead law-
yers and contained 337 total actions, making it a relatively
small proceeding in both overall size and number of leadership
counsel. Porsche Cars featured the unusual event of a judge
appointing an entire firm co-lead counsel.  The whole proceed-
ing encompassed only eight actions, again making it a small
proceeding relative to others in our data.  The size of the pro-
ceedings suggests that they are outliers as they may not pre-
sent the case management challenges typical of most
multidistrict products-liability proceedings.
The larger network features more of the principal products-
liability proceedings that appear in the academic literature and
in media coverage.  Both proceedings and attorneys have key
roles in the network’s cohesion.  Four of the pelvic-mesh cases
are in the center of the network,124 and most connections radi-
ate from this core set of proceedings.  The pelvic-mesh cases
comprise 55% of all cases pending in multidistrict proceed-
ings—the largest grouping since the asbestos litigations.125
Given the number of participating attorneys and the appoint-
ment of the same 62 attorneys to leadership in four of the five
pelvic-mesh proceedings, this is hardly surprising.  What is
interesting, however, is how these proceedings feature some
but not all of the attorneys most central to the network.  Look-
ing specifically at degree centrality emphasizes this point.
123 In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 986 (N.D.
Ill. 1996).
124 In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187
(S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2325 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
125 See Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MUL-
TIDISTRICT LITIG. (Oct. 15 2015) [https://perma.cc/EZ7N-QVCM].
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FIGURE 3: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-
PRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS, DEGREE
CENTRALITY HIGHLIGHTED
Figure 3 above highlights degree centrality.  In general, the
more central a node (actor or event) is to a network, the more
opportunities it has to influence others and receive information
and support from others in the network.126  That, in turn, gives
those actors social capital; people who are more central to a
network may have opportunities and advantages that those on
the periphery lack.127  Higher degree centrality—the number of
ties a node has to other nodes—may indicate influential insid-
ers who are well positioned to control how information flows
over the network and to spin that information in ways that
benefit them.128  As such, the literature on repeat players sug-
126 See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 164. R
127 See id.
128 See id. at 164–65.
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gests that degree centrality is a particularly apt measurement:
attorneys appointed as leaders in more proceedings can make
more connections.129
Those events with the highest degree centrality include
four of the pelvic-mesh proceedings130 and litigation against
the New England Compounding Pharmacy.131  The attorneys
with the highest degree centrality include Richard Arsenault,
Daniel Becnel, Jr., Dianne Nast, Christopher Seeger, and Jer-
rold Parker.  Many of these attorneys appear in a substantial
number of proceedings, both generally and in our data specifi-
cally.  Arsenault is featured in eighteen proceedings in our
data, Seeger appears in sixteen, Becnel and Nast each appear
in fourteen, and Parker appears in eleven.  They are well con-
nected, so to speak, and presumably exhibit judicially pre-
ferred characteristics of experience, cooperative tendencies,
and an ability to finance the litigation.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings in which these at-
torneys appear are not the same.  Becnel and Seeger do not
appear as leaders in any of the five proceedings with the high-
est degree centrality: the pelvic-mesh cases against C.R.
Bard,132 American Medical Systems,133 Boston Scientific,134
and Ethicon,135 or the New England Compounding Pharmacy
litigation.136  In fact, what links these two lawyers with the rest
of the network is their participation in Accutane.137  Of the
eleven proceedings most central to the network (based on all
measures of centrality) Becnel appears in only two and Seeger
appears in only one.  It appears that the importance of these
two attorneys to this network is in linking those proceedings
129 See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 158. R
130 In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187
(S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2325 (J.P.M.L 2012).
131 In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
132 In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2187 (S.D.
W. Va. 2014).
133 In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2325
(J.P.M.L. 2012).
134 In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2326 (S.D.
W. Va. 2016).
135 In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2327 (S.D. W.
Va. 2014).
136 In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
137 In re Accutane (Isotrentinoin) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1626, No. 8:04-md-
2523 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
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and attorneys in the upper right portion of the network to the
central nest.  Extending this analysis to other types of multidis-
trict proceedings may show a different pattern.
FIGURE 4: LEAD LAWYER NETWORK, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND
SALES-PRACTICE MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS,
BETWEENNESS HIGHLIGHTED
Figure 4 illustrates betweenness.  Betweenness centrality
measures how often a given attorney or proceeding falls along
the shortest path to other attorneys or proceedings.138  It helps
to identify which events or actors might play either a gatekeep-
ing or toll-taking role, for nodes with high betweenness rank-
138 See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 174; Katz & Stafford, supra note 16, R
at 495 (“[B]etweenness centrality is often used to identify the bridges between
different communities and clusters.  To identify these gatekeepers, betweenness
calculates the shortest paths (known as geodesics) between all pairs of vertices,
identifies the frequency of each node appearing on those paths, then normalizes
the statistic.”).
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ings can act as information brokers—relaying, distorting, or
disrupting the information they pass to others.139  When attor-
neys form the shortest distance from one attorney to the next,
they might engage in rent extraction or gatekeeping; the effi-
ciency of the network requires information to flow through
them, which increases their power within the network.  These
lawyers join otherwise disparate groups.  Attorneys with high
betweenness rankings may likewise broker litigation financing
arrangements between plaintiffs’ law firms or negotiate global
settlements.
Looking at the betweenness ranking, we find a list of lead
attorneys similar to those in the degree centrality discussion,
but a different list of proceedings.  While New England Com-
pounding Pharmacy is also on this list,140 the other proceedings
are different, including Accutane,141 Fosamax,142 Propecia,143
and Yasmin/Yaz.144  Interestingly, unlike the degree centrality
list (composed of the pelvic-mesh cases—involving a medical
device), here we see pharmaceutical litigations.  The attorney
list—Richard Arsenault, Daniel Becnel, Jr., Dianne Nast, Joe
Rice, and Christopher Seeger—is almost exactly the same, with
the exception of Joe Rice appearing in place of Jerrold Parker.
Rice makes an interesting series of connections in the network,
tying the largest multidistrict litigation of all time, Asbestos,145
and litigation over BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill146 to all
other proceedings. Without his appearance in leadership in
both proceedings, neither Deepwater Horizon nor Asbestos
would connect to the rest of the nest in our data.
Overall, the network shows a strong, cohesive center,
where attorneys participate in leadership in many multidistrict
proceedings, and a set of attorneys with relatively few connec-
tions, both to proceedings and other lead lawyers.  To clarify
the center of the network, we kept the attorneys participating
139 See BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 174–75. R
140 In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:13-md-2419 (D. Mass. 2013).
141 In re Accutane (Isotrentinoin) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1626, No. 8:04-md-
2523 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
142 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y 2014).
143 In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-02331 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
144 In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-02100 (S.D. Ill. 2010).
145 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 875, No. 2:02-md-875 (E.D.
Pa. 2013).
146 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on
April 20, 2010, No. 10-md-02179 (E.D. La. 2012).
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in leadership in two or more multidistrict litigations in our data
(thereby excluding 786 attorneys, or 78% of the data) and
regraphed the network, which appears below.147
FIGURE 5: ATTORNEYS WITH TWO OR MORE LEADERSHIP
APPEARANCES, PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-PRACTICES
MULTIDISTRICT PROCEEDINGS
If we focus on the attorneys with at least two leadership
appearances, we see a similar picture.  Figure 5 above shows
the same network after removing all the attorneys who appear
as leaders in only one multidistrict proceeding in our data.
This figure shows more clearly how closely related four of the
147 Pruning nodes is a well-established and recommended approach to analyze
large networks.  BORGATTI ET AL., supra note 112, at 252. R
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pelvic-mesh litigations148 are to each other in terms of the par-
ticipating attorneys.  In fact, as Figure 6 below shows, if we look
at the entities with the highest eigen values (attorneys and
proceedings closest to other key attorneys and proceedings), we
find that those four proceedings include all five attorneys who
have the highest eigen values: Richard Arsenault, Dianne Nast,
Jerrold Parker, Jane Conroy, and Michelle Parfitt.
Figure 6 illustrates how much pull those four pelvic-mesh
proceedings have on the current picture of multidistrict litiga-
tion provided by our data.  Highlighting eigen value indicates a
way to consider an attorney’s importance in a relative way: how
important are the attorneys to which that attorney is con-
nected?149  While degree centrality measures the number of
connections, and betweenness measures how key an attorney
is to connecting other parts of the network efficiently, eigen
value considers the importance of the connections an attorney
makes.  It is perhaps here where the centers of power are most
likely to be seen.  The four pelvic-mesh proceedings, and the
attorneys participating in them, are central to the network of all
attorneys with a leadership role in two or more products-liabil-
ity proceedings.  This is likely in part because so many of the
attorneys in one pelvic-mesh litigation are in another (which is
why they rank so highly in degree centrality), but also because
these cases involve some of the attorneys most common to all
multidistrict products-liability proceedings.  In other words,
the related nature of the pelvic-mesh proceedings strengthens
ties among lawyers who were already interacting with each
other more than one would find outside the realm of complex
litigation.
148 In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2325
(J.P.M.L 2012); In re Boston Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
2326 (S.D. W. Va. 2016); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2187 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 2327 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).
149 See Williams et al., supra note 20, at 158. R
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FIGURE 6: ATTORNEYS WITH TWO OR MORE LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES
IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY OR SALES-PRACTICES MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATIONS, EIGEN VALUE HIGHLIGHTED
2. Centrality’s Importance to Leadership Selection
What do these interlocking connections mean in practice
and how do they affect the nature of the proceedings them-
selves?  The relative importance of lead attorneys to the overall
network only begins to tell the story of the role these repeat
players have in the world of multidistrict litigation, for all kinds
of things can flow through a network—money, trust, influence,
information, reputations, and even sanctions.150  Each and
every tie provides leaders with opportunities to influence and
be influenced.  And, as Professor Stanley Milgram demon-
150 See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 125–26. R
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strated with his famous crowd experiment (where research as-
sistants stared up at a nearby window on a city street), the
more people who exhibit a particular behavior, the more likely
others are to copy that behavior.151  Add to that that intercon-
nected agents can have emergent properties—that networked
people can demonstrate complicated, shared behavior without
explicitly coordinating with each other—and hypotheses about
the potential for norm development and entrenchment can be
extensive.152
What we can determine with certainty is that attorneys
with more appearances in proceedings are more likely to be
appointed to leadership positions, and attorneys in leadership
design master settlement agreements.  If we look specifically at
the type of leadership roles we can begin to separate those
making the rules from those merely playing by them.  All the
attorneys in our network served in some leadership position
within a multidistrict litigation, but even among this highly
experienced group of attorneys there are those who appear
more often than others.  Table 3 below shows how much lead-
ership experience the top twenty-five repeat plaintiffs-side
players in our dataset have, followed by Table 4, which illus-
trates the leadership experience among the defense bar by
firm.153
151 CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 24. R
152 See id. at 26 (discussing emergent properties and likening them to more
than the sum of their parts—“A cake has a taste not found in any one of its
ingredients”).
153 Judicial appointments to leadership roles on the defense side are rare and
typically used only in cases where the number of defendants requires more formal
coordination.  More comprehensive lists of leadership appearances by the top 50
attorneys in our data, as well as firm experience, is available in the Appendix.
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Arsenault, Richard 3 1 2 13 2 21 18 
Seeger, Christopher 1 2 3 12 2 21 16 
Nast, Dianne 2 1 2 12 2 19 14 
Becnel, Jr., Daniel 0 1 2 11 0 14 14 
Parker, Jerrold 0 0 1 10 0 11 11 
Conroy, Jayne 1 1 1 8 1 12 10 
Parfitt, Michelle 0 1 2 8 0 11 10 
Levin, Arnold 2 1 1 8 3 15  9 
Robinson, Jr., Mark 2 1 2 7 2 14 10 
London, Michael 2 2 2 7 1 14  9 
Crump, Martin 0 0 1 7 0 8  8 
DeBartolomeo, A.J. 0 0 0 7 0 7  7 
Flaherty, Yvonne 0 0 0 7 0 7  7 
Osborne, Joseph 0 0 0 7 0 7  7 
Thompson III, Fred 3 1 1 6 1 12  8 
Shkolnik, Hunter 1 0 1 6 1 9  8 
Restaino, John 1 0 1 6 2 10  7 
Cartmell, Thomas 0 0 2 6 0 8  7 
Dugan, II, James 0 0 0 6 1 7  7 
Zonies, Joseph 0 0 1 6 0 7  6 
Abrams, Rachel 0 0 0 6 0 6  6 
Blizzard, Edward 0 0 0 6 0 6  6 
Oliver, Alyson 0 0 0 6 0 6  6 
Lanier, W. Mark 1 0 3 5 2 11  8 
Flowers, Peter 1 0 2 5 0 8  7 
TABLE 4: HIGH-LEVEL REPEAT PLAYER DEFENSE FIRMS WITH FIVE
OR MORE LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES
Defense Law Firm Attorney MDL Multidistrict Proceedings
Appearances








Bryan Cave LLP 12 Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van (No. II)
Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastics
Propecia (Finasteride)
Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate)
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Defense Law Firm Attorney MDL Multidistrict Proceedings
Appearances
Butler Snow LLP 12 Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys.
Propecia (Finasteride)
Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing
Ulmer & Berne LLP 12 Celexa and Lexapro
Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing
Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
Watson Fentanyl Patch




Tucker Ellis LLP 10 OrthoEvra
DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., ASR Hip Implant
Propecia (Finasteride)
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys.
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Fulbright & Jaworski LLP 9 Fosamax (MDL 1789)
Denture Cream
Coloplast Corp. Pelvic Support Sys.
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
McGuire Woods LLP 7 ConAgra Peanut Butter
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, 7 Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration
Meagher & Flom LLP Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
Implant
New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.
Baker & Daniels LLP 6 Zimmer Durom Hip Cup
Zimmer Nexgen Knee Implant
Ice Miller LLP 6 Accutane (Isotrentinoin)
Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene
Jones Day 6 Mentor Corp. ObTape Transobuturator Sling
Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Nelson Mullins Riley & 6 FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde
Scarborough LLP C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic Repair System
Boston Scientific Corp Pelvic Repair Sys.
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
Reed Smith 6 Mirapex
Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) (No. II)
NuvaRing
American Medical Systems Inc., Pelvic
Repair Sys.
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 5 OrthoEvra
Levaquin
DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., ASR Hip Implant
Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Marketing
Propulsid
Halleland Lewis Nilan & 5 Mirapex
Johnson Levaquin
Baycol
McDermott, Will, & Emery 5 Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/
Dexfenfluramine)
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”)
IKO Roofing Shingle
Wheeler Trig O’Donnell LLP 5 Gadolinium Contrast Dyes
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer
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Typically, highly experienced attorneys serve on a steering
committee in addition to serving in one other leadership
position within a proceeding.154  The attorneys shown to be
central to the network above have the greatest amount of
experience in leadership positions as well.  Again, while these
results are not surprising (more experience in these
proceedings means more opportunities for leadership, and one
leadership appointment makes the next leadership
appointment more likely), it is important to point out that
attorneys who are central to a network of products-liability
proceedings are not only powerful for their connections to other
attorneys, but for their leadership in conducting and shaping
the proceedings.  These attorneys broker the master
settlements that resolve these cases.  This raises the question
of what their deals look like, as well as the unanswerable
question about how those deals might differ if courts appointed
non-central attorneys to leadership.
III
EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING THE DEALS THOSE REPEAT
PLAYERS DESIGN
How might well-connected lead lawyers’ ties affect the set-
tlements they design?  As Professors Nicholas Christakis and
James Fowler demonstrated, social networks can have
profound effects on people’s lives—they can spread joy and
health and help us understand how markets and democracies
function, but they can also spread things like depression, vio-
lence, and even suicide.155  They find that all social networks
“tend to magnify whatever they are seeded with.”156  We can
only guess at the seeds in multidistrict litigation.  As Part I
explained, transferee judges try to select cooperative, exper-
ienced, and well-financed leaders and presumably encourage
efficiency in accordance with the authorizing statute’s mis-
sion.157  But, because all of these leaders are agents, we must
154 We might begin to think of this as positional inequality—the notion that
some are better off based on where they are located within the network.  Their
situational inequality might be causally related to positional inequality, for if
judges routinely select those attorneys with more financial means (situational
inequality due to socioeconomics) then they are likely to be better connected
positionally within the network. See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 31. R
155 CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 31. R
156 Id.
157 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (authorizing the Panel to transfer cases when
doing so “will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions”).
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also consider the possibility of a more troubling seed: an agent
may better herself at her principal’s expense.
To be clear, there is no way for us to reliably test what flows
through our network.158  By looking at the settlements that
well-connected leaders implement and the fee practices they
influence, however, we can formulate better-informed hypothe-
ses about the network’s effects.  Using a variety of sources
(including media stories and docket entries from the proceed-
ings), we analyzed the publicly available nonclass settlements
that resulted within our dataset, the accompanying lead law-
yers’ common-benefit fee awards, and the attorneys in leader-
ship roles who designed the settlements.  Specifically, as
indicia of advantages that repeat players might enjoy that one-
shotters do not, we looked for provisions that one might argue
principally benefit the lead lawyers and the defendants, and
not necessarily the plaintiffs.  We focused our inquiry on four
main types of provisions: (1) those that induce claimants to
settle and thereby generate closure for defendants; (2) those
compensating lead lawyers; (3) those that allow unclaimed
funds to revert to the defendant; and (4) those that reduce
payout amounts to latecomers who do not have counsel as of
the settlement date.
This enterprise has two notable caveats.  First, settlement
provisions designed to induce claimants to settle can deliver
closure that unlocks gains for the settling plaintiffs that may
not exist otherwise—a “peace premium.”159  Defendants, par-
ticularly those with publicly traded stock, are often eager to
end lawsuits and ease shareholders’ minds about future busi-
ness prospects.  In class actions, defendants accomplished clo-
sure through a combination of preclusion doctrines and
walkaway provisions, which allowed defendants to withdraw
the settlement offer if too many class members opted out.  The
need for finality persists even when multidistrict litigation con-
cludes through a nonclass, aggregate settlement.  But, without
a certified class, closure requires more creativity in settlement
design.  The trouble comes both in the lack of structural assur-
ances of adequate representation in appointing leaders on the
front end, and on the back end in policing the line between
acceptable settlement tactics that rational claimants should
accept because the offer is too good to decline and those that
158 We do not have access to attorneys’ financial assets, for example, and for
reasons explored elsewhere, attorneys are unlikely to be candid if interviewed.
See Burch, supra note 71, at 155–58. R
159 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 162. R
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claimants can’t refuse in The Godfather sense—a gun to the
head accompanied by assurances that either the person’s sig-
nature or brains would appear on the contract.160
Second, lead lawyers may perform the lion’s share of the
work in any given multidistrict litigation, and they should be
compensated for their performance insofar as it benefits claim-
ants.161  But allowing lead lawyers to negotiate their fees with
the defendant—either by inserting fee-related provisions within
the settlement or by having the defendant pay their fees di-
rectly—is troubling.  Leadership fees are big business: using a
settlement agreement to contract around the initial judicial fee
award in Guidant, for example, boosted lead lawyers’ fees by
$29.7 million.162  And while defendants must be on board with
the deal, they are not naı¨ve; fee provisions may cost them noth-
ing if they come from the plaintiffs’ share of the funds, yet
defendants receive a powerful bargaining chip that they might
exchange for things like lower settlement amounts, higher par-
ticipation rates, or stringent criteria to qualify for settlement
money.163  Moreover, through settlement consent, lead lawyers
might be able to tax state-court plaintiffs who eluded federal
jurisdiction and the transferee judge’s common-benefit assess-
ment.  Perhaps lead lawyers confer a benefit here as well, but
the fee assessments are typically uniform and not tailored to
quantum-meruit principles.164
Class settlements can include coercive provisions designed
to deliver closure, too.165  In the Sulzer hip implant litigation,
for example, defendant Sulzer hired Dickie Scruggs, a noted
plaintiffs’ attorney, to design a class settlement that minimized
opt outs.166  Among other provisions, that settlement placed
liens on virtually all the defendants’ assets in favor of settling
class members such that the opt outs would have to wait at
least six years before receiving payment.167  And if Sulzer set-
160 Richard Nagareda has written about class action provisions extensively in
these terms.  Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The
Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2003).
161 See Burch, supra note 20, at 130–35. R
162 In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-
md-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *2–4, 16 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); Burch, supra
note 20, at 81. R
163 See Silver & Miller, supra note 11, at 134. R
164 See Burch, supra note 20, at 103–09, 128–35. R
165 For an in-depth overview of these provisions, see Nagareda, supra note 50, R
at 204–19.
166 Jess Bravin, Sulzer Medica Reaches Novel Class-Action Pact, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 2001, at A1.
167 In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (E.D. Ohio
2001).
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tled with an opt-out claimant on more favorable terms than
those in the settlement, it would have to pay all participating
class members more as well.168  Functioning a bit like a dooms-
day device that would never actually be triggered, the idea was
to signal to opt-outs that they would never receive a better deal
than what the settlement offered.  As Scruggs described it, “[I]f
anybody opts out, they still have to try their case, win their
case, win their appeal, and then there would be no assets to
satisfy their judgment, because they are all pledged to the
class.”169
But the circumstances in multidistrict proceedings make
closure and fee-related clauses even more troubling.  In Sulzer,
objectors (whose attorneys stood to gain fees only if their objec-
tion improved the deal170) challenged the legitimacy of those
provisions on appeal, which led settlement designers to boost
benefits to class members, change the deal’s questionable pro-
visions, and remove the lien—all before the Sixth Circuit could
rule on the original settlement.171  Nonclass aggregate settle-
ments, by contrast, are private deals with no appellate review
to correct error or threaten change.  Judges do not ensure the
settlement is fair under Rule 23(e), subject lead lawyers to ade-
quate representation scrutiny under Rule 23(a)(4), or have ex-
plicit control over attorneys’ fees under Rule 23(h).  As such,
nonclass settlements lack key structural failsafes.  Thus,
clauses that appear to principally benefit the attorneys rather
than their clients raise significant concerns.
Turning to the settlements themselves, of the seventy-three
products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations
in our dataset, we were able to obtain private, nonclass settle-
ments in ten multidistrict litigations (three of which generated
two settlements each for a total of thirteen settlements),172
class settlements in twenty, and one bankruptcy-related settle-
ment.173  One of the nonclass settlements (in the American
Medical Systems litigation) is a partial settlement: it covers
168 Id.
169 Bravin, supra note 166, at A1. R
170 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting
that when objectors confer a benefit on the class, they should receive attorneys’
fees).
171 See Nagareda, supra note 50, at 205 n.240 (2003) (“A preliminary ruling by R
the Sixth Circuit did not bode well for that court’s ultimate disposition of the
settlement and, as such, spurred negotiations that ultimately recast the deal.”).
172 Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and Yasmin/Yaz each generated two
settlement agreements.
173 For an overview of the proceedings’ resolutions, see supra Figure 1 and
accompanying text.
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only the claimants represented by two law firms, not all the
pending claims.  Because the other settlements in that case
were confidential, we could not determine whether that settle-
ment was representative of the others.  Twenty-one other mul-
tidistrict litigations in our data have also settled; however,
those aggregate settlements were confidential and nonpublic.
Because this Article focuses on the practices and norms
that develop outside of directly authorized judicial supervision
under established class-action principles, we limited our anal-
ysis to the thirteen publicly available nonclass settlements that
resulted from ten multidistrict litigations.  Our analysis, while
limited, nevertheless provides some interesting insights into
what the settlements brokered by repeat players look like.  And
though the number of publicly available private settlements
was relatively small, the proceedings in which those settle-
ments occurred collectively included 64,107 total actions.174
Table 5, infra, shows the settlements in our data by settlement
date, from oldest to newest.  We indicate the settlements we
examined using boldface type.
174 Using the most recent data available on the proceedings, the Pending
MDLs by District as of July 15, 2016 (or our earlier 2013 information where the
proceedings were no longer pending), the proceedings contained the following
number of actions: Propulsid 474, Vioxx 10,320, Fosamax 1,141, Yasmin/Yaz
11,858, DePuy ASR 9,877, Biomet 2,607, NuvaRing 1,895, Actos 5,111, American
Medical Systems 20,231, and Zimmer Durom 593.
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TABLE 5: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS OCCURRING WITHIN THE
DATASET BY SETTLEMENT DATE (AS OF JULY 15, 2016)
MDL 














































































875 Asbestos 7/29/91 1980s No No 16% (2/12) 
986 Factor VII or IX 
Concentrate Blood 
Prods. 
12/7/1993 5/8/1997 Yes Yes 15% (2/13) 




1/6/1998 1/3/2002 Yes Yes 15% (2/13) 
1355 Propulsid 8/7/2000 4/30/2004 No Yes 90% (10/11) 
1431 Baycol 12/18/01 6/30/2005 No No 68% (15/22) 
1657 Vioxx 2/16/2005 11/9/2007 No Yes 50% (14/28) 
1742 Ortho Evra 3/1/2006 10/13/2008 No No 71% (15/21) 
1836 Mirapex 6/22/2007 2/29/2009 No No 100% (1/1 firm) 
1909 Gadolinium 
Contrast Dyes 
2/29/2008 4/15/2009 No No 72% (13/18) 
1845 ConAgra Peanut 
Butter 
6/17/2007 5/29/2009 No No 26% (5/19) 
1763 Human Tissue  6/13/2007 1/30/2010 No No 33% (2/6) 
1871 Avandia 6/11/07 6/01/2010 No No 79% (19/24) 
2004 Mentor Corp. 
ObTape 
12/3/08 6/8/2010 No No 66% (4/6) 




8/13/2008 1/3/2011 Yes Yes 22% (2/9) 
1873 FEMA Trailer 
Formaldehyde 
10/24/2007 3/14/2011 Yes Yes 18% (2/11) 
1842 Kugel Mesh Hernia 
Patch 
6/22/2007 7/1/2011 No No 75% (9/12) 
1953 Heparin 6/6/2008 12/1/2011 No No 57% (12/21) 
2188 Apple iPhone 4 
Marketing & Sales 
Practices 
10/8/2010 1/1/2012 Yes Yes 0% (0/4) 
2179 Deepwater Horizon 8/10/2010 4/18/2012 Yes Yes 36% (7/19) 
2308 Sketchers Toning 
Shoe 
12/19/2011 5/02/2012 Yes Yes 80% (4/5) 
2023 Bayer Corp. 
Combination 
Aspirin 
4/14/2009 5/16/2012 Yes Yes 50% (6/12) 
1507 Prempro 3/4/2003 6/8/2012 No No 12.5% (3/24) 
2047 Chinese Drywall 1/13/2010 6/14/2012 Yes Yes 70.5% (12/17) 
1958 Zurn Pex Plumbing 8/21/2008 10/15/2012 Yes Yes 70% (7/10) 
2284 Imprelis Herbicide 10/20/2011 10/19/2012 Yes Yes 60% (3/5) 
1943 Levaquin 6/13/2008 10/30/2012 No No 62% (5/8) 
2223 Navistar Diesel 
Engine 
4/13/2011 11/1/2012 Yes Yes 44% (8/18) 
2151 Toyota Motor Corp. 
Unintended 
Acceleration 
4/9/2010 12/26/2012 Yes Yes 40.9% (9/22) 
2092 Chantix 
(Varenicline) 
10/1/2009 1/15/2013 No No 75% (12/16) 
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MDL 














































































2100 Yasmin and Yaz 
(Drospirenone) 
10/1/2009 3/15/2013 No Yes 89% (17/19) 
2372 Watson Fentanyl 
Patch 
8/7/2012 6/4/2013 No No 0% (0/8) 
2233 Porsche Plastic 
Coolant Tubes 
5/23/2011 7/26/2013 Yes Yes 0.07% (1/13) 
2197 DePuy ASR Hip 
Implant 
12/3/2010 11/11/2013 No Yes 80% (25/31) 
1789 Fosamax 11/21/2011 12/9/2013 No Yes 66% (8/12) 
2325 American Medical 
Systems 
2/7/12 4/30/2013 No Semia 100% (62/62) 
  
2008 Land Rover LR3 
Tire Wear 
2/23/09 5/30/2013 Yes Yes 66% (4/6) 
2391 Biomet Magnum 
Hip Implant 
10/2/2012 1/31/2014 No Yes 58% (14/24) 
1964 NuvaRing 8/22/2008 2/7/2014 No Yes 35% (6/17) 
1629 Neurontin 10/26/2004 5/30/2014 Yes Yes 50% (4/8) 
2385 Pradaxa 8/8/2012 5/28/2014 No No 70% (19/27) 
2387 Coloplast Corp. 
Pelvic Support Sys. 
8/6/2012 9/22/2014 No No 100% (3/3) 
2333 MI Windows & 
Doors 
4/23/12 12/24/2014 Yes Yes 46% (6/13) 





2/13/2015 Bankr.b Yes 42.8% (3/7) 
2283 Building Materials 
Corp. of Am. 
10/11/11 4/22/2015 Yes Yes 69% (9/13) 
2327 Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic 
Repair 
2/7/2012 3/10/2015 No No 100% (62/62) 
2299 Actos 
(Pioglitazone) 
12/29/2011 4/29/2015 No Yes 68% (18/22) 
2187 C.R. Bard, Inc. 
Pelvic Repair Sys. 
10/12/2010 6/23/2015 No No 98% (62/63) 
2326 Boston Scientific 
Corp. Pelvic Repair 
Sys. 
2/7/2012 12/7/2015 No No 100% (62/62) 
2316 Ford Motor Co. 
Spark Plug & 3-
Valve Engine 
2/8/2012 1/26/2016 Yes Yes 83% (5/6) 
2158 Zimmer Durom 
Hip Cup 
9/9/2010 2/11/2016 No Yes 100% (3/3) 
2100 Whirlpool Corp. 
Front Loading 
Washer 
12/20/2008 5/11/2016 Yes Yes 61% (8/13) 
a This settlement was included as an exhibit to a Securities and Exchange
Commission filing; some confidential parts of it were redacted. The agreement is
between American Medical Systems and Freese & Goss, PLLC and Matthews &
Associates.
b New England Compounding Pharmacy is in the midst of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, so the settlement is a bankruptcy trust.
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A. Settlement Attorneys
Before examining these thirteen settlements, we must first
confirm that the repeat players we previously discussed partici-
pated in leadership positions when these agreements were
brokered.  Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attorneys who fre-
quently appeared as leaders in our data were key to these
settlements.
The multidistrict proceedings we examined varied in terms
of the number of repeat players appointed to leadership posi-
tions. Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, American Medical Systems,175
and Propulsid were at the high end, with repeat players occupy-
ing 100, 100, and 90%  of the plaintiffs’ leadership positions,
respectively. Yasmin/Yaz and DePuy ASR followed suit with
repeat players in 89 and 80% of those positions. Actos and
Fosamax had slightly fewer repeat players, with 68% in Actos
and 66% in Fosamax.  Both Biomet and Vioxx filled around half
of the plaintiffs’ leadership positions with repeat players—58%
in Biomet and 50% in Vioxx.  And NuvaRing contained the few-
est repeat players, with 35%.
What became apparent in reviewing the settlements, how-
ever, was that it was not so much the sheer number of repeat
players involved in a proceeding that seemingly affected the
outcome, but the influence of a relatively small cadre of high-
level, well-connected repeat players occupying the most power-
ful positions who actively designed and implemented those set-
tlements.  Our findings here are consistent with those in other
disciplines; in research and development laboratories, for ex-
ample, about six individuals act as information and technologi-
cal gatekeepers, or bridges, in network terms.176  Table 6 below
shows which attorneys with the highest degree centrality (to
take one measure) appeared as leaders in the examined
settlements.
175 The judge handling pelvic-mesh cases appointed the same sixty-two attor-
neys as lead lawyers in four out of the five pelvic-mesh multidistrict proceedings
he was handling.
176 Thomas J. Allen & Stephen I. Cohen, Information Flow in Research and
Development Laboratories, 14 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 12, 13 (1969).
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TABLE 6: PARTICIPATION IN NONCLASS SETTLEMENTS BY REPEAT
PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS WITH THE HIGHEST
DEGREE CENTRALITY
MDL Richard Daniel Dianne Jerrold Christopher
Number MDL Name Arsenault Becnel, Jr. Nast Parker Seeger
1355 Propulsid Yes Yes No No Yes
1657 Vioxx Yes No No No Yes
1789 Fosamax No No No No Yes
Yasmin and Yaz
2100 (Drospirenone) No Yes Yes No Yes
2197 DePuy ASR Hip Implant Yes No No Yes Yes
2391 Biomet Magnum Hip Implant Yes No No No No
1964 NuvaRing Yes No No No No
2299 Actos (Pioglitazone) Yes No Yes Yes Yes
American Medical Sys-
2325 tems177 Yes No Yes Yes No
2158 Zimmer Durom Hip Cup No No No No Yes
B. Settlement Provisions and Lead Lawyers’ Fees
Given the interconnections among these attorneys in our
data, it should not be surprising to find commonality in the
settlement provisions.  What may be surprising, however, is
how closely these settlement provisions mirror one another,
beginning with the two Propulsid settlements.  The Propulsid
settlements were the first nonclass settlements in our data,
and, as we show, they appear to be the template that repeat
players sought to replicate and improve upon in future settle-
ments.  As such, we introduce these settlements in detail to
highlight the means by which leaders resolved mass litigation
without the class device—principally through widespread
plaintiff participation requirements.  As we note, these settle-
ments not only helped end the litigation for the defendant, but
paid plaintiffs’ lawyers directly for doing so.  The question that
lingers, however, is whether these developments benefitted
one-shot plaintiffs.
In the first Propulsid settlement, three provisions worked
in concert to induce closure.  First, the deal required 85% of
those with death claims and 75% of those with injury claims to
enroll in the program before the agreement took effect.178  Sec-
ond, to entice plaintiffs to participate, the settlement escalated
the defendant’s payment amounts based on higher participa-
177 Note that we have only one of several aggregate settlements negotiated with
American Medical Systems. The others are confidential.
178 MDL-1355 Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-
1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter First Propulsid Settlement].  The plain-
tiffs’ steering committee represented about 4,000 people, 300 of whom allegedly
died from using Propulsid. Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement Over
Propulsid Suit, DATAMONITOR INDUSTRY NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2004.
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tion percentages and included a $4 million “bonus” if 100% of
non-death claimants enrolled.179  Third, an “opt-out” form ac-
companied the settlement even though the settlement was not
a class action and all claimants had to affirmatively “opt in.”180
Designed for plaintiffs who refused to enroll, this form ex-
plained that the client’s chosen attorney was no longer permit-
ted to represent her under the settlement’s terms and
authorized counsel to withdraw from the representation.181
So, the client was opting out of representation—not just declin-
ing the settlement offer.
Somewhat like arbitration, submitting claims to the settle-
ment program extinguished them, win or lose.  After four years,
the panel of three physicians reviewing claims deemed only 11
of 1,356 claimants eligible for payouts.182  Still, the program
could not bind absent plaintiffs as a class action does, and the
first settlement did not cover 2,000 state-court plaintiffs or
5,000 claimants who had not filed as of February 1, 2004.183
Nevertheless, by using a lodestar analysis that estimated
the attorney’s fee from the money deposited for awards instead
of the money actually paid to claimants, the court awarded the
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee a fee of $22.5 million.184  No one
objected.185
At the end of the first settlement only 32 out of 4,245
plaintiffs satisfied the settlement’s claims criteria and were eli-
gible for relief.186  Collectively, those 32 plaintiffs received little
more than $3.66 million.187  The remaining settlement funds
went elsewhere: two donations of more than $8 million each
179 First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 178, § 3.B. R
180 Opt Out Form for Propulsid MDL Settlement, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. 2004) [http://perma.cc/72JG-APEF].
181 Id.
182 Joint Report 62 at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2008); Janet McConnaughey, Two Propulsid Settlements; A
Handful of Checks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 29, 2008.
183 Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State,
Federal Claims, BNA CLASS ACTION LITIG. RPT., Jan. 27, 2006.  Earlier reports
estimated that 12,000 people had not yet sued at the time of the first settlement.
Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement, supra note 178. R
184 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order); First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 177, § 19.
185 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order) (“No objections were made to the Motion.”).
186 Joint Report No. 89 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants Liaison Counsel at 1–2, In
re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).
187 See Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012).  The pre-
cise total was $3,665,167.74.  Not surprisingly, it was not included in the Joint
Report but derived from numbers provided in that and previous reports.
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were awarded to Canada’s Prepulsid Resolution Program and
charitable organizations;188 $40 million reverted to defendant
Johnson & Johnson;189 and $12 million remained in the settle-
ment fund.190
Given the continued need to resolve the remaining claims,
in December of 2005, reportedly at the behest of counsel repre-
senting state-court plaintiffs, the federal Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee and the State Liaison Committee negotiated Propul-
sid II.  This $15 million settlement mostly mirrored the first
one, but required 90% of death claimants and 95% of personal-
injury claimants to consent before becoming effective.191  This
time, the physician panel found only 5 out of 1,767 claimants
compensable, and Johnson & Johnson paid slightly more than
$2.85 million from the settlement fund.192  Nevertheless, the
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee requested over $4.1 million in
fees.193  Once again, no objections to that motion appeared on
the docket, and the court granted the request.194  The court
also granted a joint motion to revert $5 million of the second
188 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2009)
(order granting joint motion for an order authorizing distribution of MDL 1 settle-
ment fund).  The money went to Louisiana Health Public Initiative, even though
claimants were geographically dispersed throughout the country.  Joint Report
No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012).
189 Joint Report No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012).  Histori-
cally, reversion clauses have served as red flags for self-dealing in class settle-
ments.  Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., statement respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of
certiorari).
190 Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to
Defendant Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-
1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
191 Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement, supra note 183; McCon- R
naughey, supra note 182. R
192 The exact number is 2,852,070, and it does not include the 2,059 claim-
ants who enrolled in the program, had their claims extinguished, but did not
submit claim forms.  Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attor-
ney’s Fees at 5 and Ex. B (Re: MDL Settlement Program II), In re Propulsid Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. 2012).
193 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees Ex.
B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012) (re:
MDL Settlement Program II).
194 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012)
(order).  The only objections to fee requests that we found were by firms that
objected not to the amount of overall fees but to that firm’s cut. E.g., Zimmerman
Reed P.L.L.P.’s Response in Partial Objection to the Plaintiffs’ Steering Commit-
tee’s Motion for the Distribution of Additional Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement
Costs, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2012);
Objection to the PSC’s Motion for Distribution of Specific Attorney’s Fees Awards
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settlement fund to the defendant, as well as the remaining
balance of all settlement and administrative funds.195  As the
litigation concluded, lead lawyers requested and received the
additional six-percent holdback fund put in place at the begin-
ning of the litigation for common-benefit fee awards, which
taxed settlements that occurred before the master settlement
agreements, and equaled $397,860.196
The lead lawyers in Propulsid noted that their settlements
were the first of their kind to globally resolve mass litigation
without the class device and, as such, “promise[d] to become
the template” for future cases.197  Using Propulsid as a base-
line, we examined the other eleven settlements in our database
for similar closure and common-benefit fee provisions.  We
find, overwhelmingly, that the settlement model produced in
the Propulsid settlements is carried out in various respects
through all other settlements in our database.  The principal
variations in the other settlements included how many plain-
tiffs had to participate in the settlement for it to take effect and
whether settlement money reverted back to the defendant in
the end.  Table 7 below shows how the small group of attorneys
negotiating, designing, and implementing future settlements in
our database consistently applied, again and again, both the
closure provisions and the common-benefit fee awards created
in Propulsid.
and for Expenses and Reimbursements, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-
md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2009) (filed by Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.).
195 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2012)
(order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the Second MDL Resolution Pro-
gram and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund
and administrative fund after all payments due thereunder have been made); In re
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
196 Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-
1355 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (order).
197 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committees Motion for
Award of Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs, In re Propulsid Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. May 3, 2005).
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Looking closely at Table 7 above and Figure 7 below shows
that even though all the settlements share and replicate certain
features, some resemble one another even more closely.  Take
DePuy ASR, NuvaRing, Actos, and Yasmin/Yaz, for example.
All employ what we call “third generation”198 versions of both
attorney-withdrawal provisions and defendant-walkaway pro-
visions in which designers enlist judges to issue “case-census”
orders that enable leaders to take stock of both pending and
unfiled claims in determining whether plaintiff participation
requirements are met.199  These four litigations shared a host
of common lead lawyers, lead law firms, and claims adminis-
trators as Figure 7 below visually demonstrates.  For instance,
Richard Arsenault was a lead lawyer in DePuy ASR, NuvaRing,
and Actos, and Chris Seeger and Mark Robinson, Jr. helped
lead DePuy, Yaz, and Actos.
Network models share inherent limitations in depicting
real-world events: “nodes” in real life have multiple flows with
other nodes, like claims administrators.  Figure 7 shows, for
example, that BrownGreer, PLC administered all four of these
settlements.
198 Infra Figure 8 and accompanying text.
199 Infra notes 211–19 and accompanying text. R
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FIGURE 7: LINKING COMMON ATTORNEYS, FIRMS, AND
ADMINISTRATORS IN DEPUY ASR, ACTOS, NUVARING,
AND YASMIN/YAZ
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1. Closure Provisions
As Propulsid illustrates, without a class-action judgment’s
claim preclusive effect, settlement designers have experi-
mented with a number of alternative closure devices that are
sometimes used alone, and sometimes used in concert with
one another.  Yet, all the settlements in our database uniformly
featured one key departure from conventional settlements: un-
like typical settlements between plaintiffs and defendants,
these deals were made between lead lawyers and the defend-
ants, and most of them explicitly required the plaintiff’s indi-
vidual attorney to become a signatory if she wanted to enroll a
single client in the settlement program.  By shifting the deal-
making entity from the client to the lawyer, these offers lever-
aged the attorney-client relationship itself to achieve closure
and tied plaintiffs’ attorneys’ financial self-interest to one an-
other as opposed to a particular client.  Put differently, we saw
a uniform departure from the conventional contingent-fee
model where an attorney’s fees increase solely based on a par-
ticular client’s outcome.
In common parlance, we refer to these interrelated closure
provisions as follows: (1) walkaway provisions, which release
the defendant from any contractual obligations if a certain per-
centage of plaintiffs do not consent to settle; (2) case-census
provisions, which rely on the presiding judge to order all attor-
neys to register their filed and unfiled claims by a certain date
such that the defendant can use that number as the denomi-
nator in calculating compliance with the walkaway percentage;
(3) attorney-recommendation provisions, which require partici-
pating attorneys to recommend the deal to all of their clients,
and (4) attorney-withdrawal provisions, which instruct attor-
neys to withdraw from representing clients who do not consent
to settle.
Across all the settlements in our database, we found the
most common closure provision to be the defendant’s ability to
walk away from its settlement offer if too few plaintiffs ac-
cepted.  The threshold for the defendant to abandon the settle-
ment varied somewhat.  In Vioxx, if fewer than 85% of plaintiffs
accepted, Merck could walk away and leave the plaintiffs and
their attorneys with nothing.200  In Fosamax, the stakes were
even higher.  If a single claimant or attorney failed to sign onto
the deal, Merck (again the defendant) could void the agree-
200 Master Settlement Agreement § 1.2.8.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
05-md-01657 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement].
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ment.201  Alternatively, Merck could reduce the settlement by
however much it would have paid the non-participating claim-
ants (as determined by the allocation committee).202  Both De-
Puy ASR settlements took a middle path, requiring 94% of
claimants to accept before the deal took effect.203
Several settlements included an overall participation
threshold as well as specific levels for various claims catego-
ries.  The two Yasmin/Yaz settlements set the overall walkaway
percentage at 90% of all eligible gallbladder claimants,204 and
97.5% of all arterial-thromboembolic-event (“ATE”) claim-
ants.205  But, in the ATE settlement, all plaintiffs set for jury
selection or trial had to consent, as did 96% of plaintiffs with
death and severe-injury cases.206  Similarly, in American Medi-
cal Systems, plaintiffs’ attorneys were required to secure re-
leases from 95% of all claimants plus 100% of cases set for
trial.207  In Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, 90% of all claimants had to
accept the defendant’s offer without mediation and 67% of
those who opted for mediation had to take the offer or the
defendant could terminate the settlement program at its dis-
cretion.208 Actos and NuvaRing shared nearly identical provi-
sions that included an overall participation rate of 95% plus
95% of wrongful-death claims, and 95% of various specific cat-
egories, such as venous thromboembolism and arterial throm-
boembolism in NuvaRing and cystectomy in Actos.209  The
thresholds were somewhat lower in Biomet.  Biomet had no
201 Master Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) (certification and joinder of counsel and
claimant’s counsel) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement].
202 Id.
203 Settlement Agreement § 17.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
DePuy Settlement]; 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement § 17.1, In re DePuy Ortho-
paedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2,
2015) [hereinafter 2015 DePuy Settlement].
204 Settlement Agreement §§ 9.01, 9.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone)
Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2013)
[hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder Settlement].
205 ATE Master Settlement Agreement §§ 3.01, 3.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz
(Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill.
Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement].
206 Id.
207 Master Settlement Agreement § II.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair
Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter
American Medical Systems Settlement].
208 U.S. Durom Cup Settlement Program Agreement §§ V.A, V.B, In re Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2016) [here-
inafter Zimmer Durom Settlement].
209 Master Settlement Agreement § 10.02, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 08-
md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter NuvaRing Settlement]; Master Settle-
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funding obligations without the consent of 90% of those with
revised hips who would receive a base award subject to various
deductions, and 67% of the mediation cases—where one party
believed it was entitled to enhanced or reduced payments.210
Case-census provisions, a relatively new development,
work in concert with walkaway thresholds to create the per-
centage’s denominator.  By jointly petitioning both the trans-
feree judge and the coordinating state-court judges, census or
“registration” provisions produce case-management orders
that require all attorneys who represent a single plaintiff in the
issuing courts to register all claims relating to the product in
which the attorney has an interest (broadly defined to include
“any financial interest of any kind whatsoever”) by a certain
date.211  These orders cover all claims, including those that are
unfiled, pending in other courts, or controlled by attorneys who
decline to recommend the deal to any client.212  Failing to com-
ply with the judicial census triggers a show-cause hearing for
counsel to satisfactorily explain the noncompliance or face dis-
missal.  The Vioxx settlement,213 both DePuy ASR settle-
ments,214 the second Yasmin/Yaz settlement,215 the Actos
settlement,216 the NuvaRing settlement,217  and the Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup settlement218 all featured census provi-
sions.219 Of these, the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup settlement is
noteworthy, for the judge not only ordered all plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to register all of their clients, but also ordered all plaintiffs
to participate in the settlement and stayed the proceedings
ment Agreement § 5.02, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md-
2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Actos Settlement].
210 Settlement Agreement Between Biomet, Inc. and Plaintiffs Executive Com-
mittee ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2014).
211 E.g., In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D.
La. Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement agreement and deadlines); In re
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2014) (case
management order of January 29, 2014 (supplemental census of claims)); In re
Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 3:09-
md-02100 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2015) (case management order no. 77 (census of
claims)).
212 E.g., In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md-2299 (W.D. La.
Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement agreement and deadlines); Actos Settle-
ment, supra note 209, § 1.02. R
213 Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, at ¶ 1.1. R
214 2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, at art. 3, §§ 3.1-3.3; 2015 DePuy R
Settlement, supra note 203, at art. 3, §§ 3.1-3.3. R
215 Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 205, § 1.02. R
216 Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.02. R
217 NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.05. R
218 Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § I.B. R
219 NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 1.05. R
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pending the conclusion of the settlement’s mediation
process.220
The attorney recommendation and attorney withdrawal
provisions from Propulsid were also common across the settle-
ments in our database, with some form of recommendation
included in all but the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup and Biomet
settlements, and explicit, mandatory attorney-withdrawal pro-
visions in Vioxx,221 Fosamax,222 and American Medical Sys-
tems.223  As in Propulsid, the recommendation and withdrawal
provisions in these three proceedings worked in concert to re-
quire an attorney who had a single client who wanted to accept
the settlement offer—whether in the multidistrict proceeding or
state court—to recommend that all of her clients accept the
deal.  If a client refused to do so, the attorney had to withdraw
from representing her.  Essentially, these provisions tie the at-
torneys’ desire to be paid for their services to the defendant’s
desire for closure.  After Vioxx, commentators frequently dis-
cussed and criticized that link,224 which may have prompted
settlement designers in Actos, NuvaRing, and Yasmin/Yaz to
require only that the lead lawyers “use their best efforts to
achieve sufficient participation to meet the participation
benchmarks necessary to effectuate the Program.”225  The Yas-
min/Yaz gallbladder settlement, however, contained an addi-
tional provision that automatically enrolled the plaintiffs in the
settlement and required them to either affirmatively opt-out of
220 In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414, ¶¶ 1–3
(D.N.J. May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
221 Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, § 1.2.8.1.  After some plaintiffs’ attorneys R
contended the settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to
mean that the attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s
best interest. See Alex Berenson, Some Lawyers Seek Changes in Vioxx Settle-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007; see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 Fed.
Appx. 391, 395–97 (5th Cir. July 16, 2010) (affirming district court judge’s han-
dling of non-settling plaintiffs).
222 Fosamax Settlement, supra note 200, ¶¶ 1–2, 5 & Ex. C at C-15 (certifica-
tion and joinder of counsel, claimant’s counsel).  The court subsequently granted
numerous’ attorneys motions to withdraw from representing non-settling claim-
ants. E.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2014) (order allowing Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor,
P.A. to withdraw as counsel).
223 Even if 95% of the claimants took the offer, the agreement still required
counsel to “employ their best efforts to obtain an executed Release from 100%,”
and if a client refused those overtures, counsel had to withdraw from representing
that client. American Medical Systems Settlement, supra note 207, §§ II.H–I. R
224 E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Clo-
sure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 266–68 (2011).
225 Each settlement uses this identical language. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement,
supra note 204, § 9.01; Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 205, § 3.01; Actos Settle- R
ment, supra note 209, § 5.01; NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 209, § 10.01. R
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the arrangement (even though it was not a class action) or
submit a claim package before the deadline.226
The two DePuy ASR settlements varied slightly in their
recommendation and withdrawal provisions.  Individual signa-
tory attorneys—not just lead lawyers—had to “represent and
warrant that they each will use their best efforts to secure all
documentation required for timely enrollment and compliance
with this Agreement,”227 and, subject to their professional
judgment, “endorse enrollment in the U.S. Program to clients
covered by this Agreement.”228  Instead of requiring plaintiffs’
counsel to withdraw from representing those clients who pre-
ferred not to settle, the Special Master could determine that a
law firm or interested counsel “did not act in good faith in
connection with the informed consent process and participa-
tion,”229 and DePuy, “at its sole option,” could expel that firm’s
or that attorney’s other clients from the settlement.230
In sum, Figure 8 below illustrates how highly connected
repeat players have replicated and advanced Propulsid’s clo-
sure provisions, presumably in response to feedback and defi-
ciencies they perceived in prior settlements.  Propulsid may well
have been a tipping point in handling nonclass litigation.  But,
because it is the earliest available nonclass settlement in our
data, we cannot be certain.  Generally speaking, tipping points
occur when innovations take off in a network, as it seems that
Propulsid’s closure provisions did.231  And it appears that re-
peat players in our network used their connections to diffuse
and perfect settlement practices originating from Propulsid.232
As such, well-connected attorneys may not only lead litiga-
tions, they may also occupy roles as influential opinion leaders;
individuals who are central to a network and rank highly on
betweenness measures can be especially effective at transmit-
ting and diffusing new ideas and practices.233
226 Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 204, § 1.01(A); In re Yasmin and R
Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 15, 2013) (case management order no. 60 at 2).
227 2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy Settlement, R
supra note 203, § 17.2.8. R
228 2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy Settlement, R
supra note 203, § 17.2.8. R
229 2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy Settlement, R
supra note 203, § 17.2.12. R
230 2015 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy Settlement, R
supra note 203, § 17.2.12. R
231 See KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 136–43, 187. R
232 Diffusion is a familiar concept—most people have caught colds (contagion)
or picked up ideas from others (diffusion). KADUSHIN, supra note 19, at 135–36. R
233 Id. at 145.
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2. Common-Benefit Fee Awards
One such practice has evolved with regard to enhancing
leaders’ common-benefit fees.  Transferee judges often issue an
order at the beginning of litigation that establishes a common-
benefit fund to pay lead lawyers for their fees and costs by
taxing the individual attorneys and their clients a specific per-
centage of clients’ gross settlement proceeds.234  While judges
have cited various rationales for their authority,235 the orders
essentially create a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, where “leav-
ing it” means referring clients to someone else or, if possible,
filing suit in state court where individual attorneys may never-
theless have to contribute if their clients want to participate in
a global settlement that federal leadership negotiates.  While
lead lawyers with clients will have to contribute to the fund too,
their money will eventually transfer from one pocket to the
other at the same rate, unless the judge awards that leader less
of a common-benefit fee.  Our analysis of the settlements and
attorneys’ fees found not only that common-benefit fees are
typically awarded, but that they are frequently increased dur-
ing the litigation when leaders request a judicially awarded
raise, negotiate some aspect of their fees with the defendant
234 See Dubay, supra note 59, at 45–46; William B. Rubenstein, On What a R
“Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATTORNEY’S FEE
DIGEST, Mar. 2009, at 87–89.
235 Burch, supra note 20, at 102–09. R
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through settlement design, or use some combination of the
two.
TABLE 8: COMMON-BENEFIT FEES

















































































































1355 Propulsid Yes, both 6% 6% Yes 
1657 Vioxx Yes 3%
(2/1) 
6.5% Yes 
1789 Fosamax Yes 9% 9% Yes 
1964 NuvaRing Yes 8% 
(5/3) 
15.5% (11/4.5) No 
 
2100 Yasmin and Yaz 
(Drospirenone) 
Yes, both 6% 
(4/2) 
11%
(9/2) for ATE;  
6%  
(4/2) for  
gallbladder 
Yes 













2197 DePuy ASR Hip 
Implant 


















Yes None set 8.6% Yes  
Midstream fee increases took a variety of forms.  In DePuy
ASR, the court initially assessed a 3% common-benefit fee plus
1% for costs.236  But after the plaintiffs’ steering committee
negotiated a settlement that required each plaintiff who set-
tled—whether in federal or state court—to consent to the
transferee court’s fee order, it then requested that the court
236 In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-
md-2197 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (case management order no. 13 at 5).
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increase fees from 3 to 5%, leaving 1% for costs intact.237  No
one objected, and the court made the change.238  Similarly, in
the Yasmin/Yaz litigation, a request from the lead lawyers in-
creased the assessments from 4 to 9%,239 with the court noting
that no one opposed the motion and that the increase received
“unanimous consent by the PSC.”240  Unlike DePuy and Yaz,
one attorney in the NuvaRing litigation did object to fees, but
only as to his own payout as a steering committee member.241
Yet, the NuvaRing plaintiffs’ steering committee was united in
asking the court to raise its common-benefit assessment from
5% fees and 3% costs to 11% for attorneys’ fees (to be sub-
tracted from primary counsel’s fees) and 4.5% for costs (sub-
tracted from clients’ settlement amount).242
Not only did plaintiffs’ leadership request and receive fee
increases midstream, but in three of the examined settlements
lead lawyers negotiated their payment directly with the defen-
dant.  That practice first appeared in the tobacco litigation243
and continues now, appearing in both Propulsid settlements,
and in the Biomet settlement.  In the first and second Propulsid
settlements, lead lawyers negotiated a $22.5 million fee244 and
a $4 million fee,245 respectively.  The court later authorized
237 2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 4.1.8; Plaintiffs’ Steering Com- R
mittee’s Motion to Modify the Common Benefit Attorney Fee Hold Back to 5% of
the Gross Recovery Amount at 1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2014).
238 In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-
md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014) (order).
239 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion to Modify Case Management Order
No. 14 at 1–2, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-2100, (S.D. Ill. Apr., 23, 2014).
240 In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2014) (order granting 3315 motion for relief);
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Pract. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-
md-2100 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2014) (case management order 63 supplement to case
management order no. 14).
241 Ferrer, Piorot & Wansbrough’s Objections to Special Master’s Recommen-
dation for Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees at 1–3, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2014).
242 In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009)
(case management order no. 3); Motion to Amend Case Management Order No. 3
at 2–7, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7,
2011); In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011)
(amended case management order no. 3).
243 See Lester Brickman, Contingency-Fee Con Men, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
2007, at A18 (describing how private attorneys “worked out a side deal with the
tobacco industry for the latter to separately pay them fees well in excess of $15
billion”).
244 First Propulsid Settlement, supra note 178, § 19. R
245 Second MDL Program Term Sheet § 19, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN602.txt unknown Seq: 68 29-SEP-17 12:56
1512 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1445
these amounts through its award,246 and then added
$397,860.00 based on the 6% common-benefit fund it installed
at the litigation’s outset.247
Biomet is likewise interesting as it was the only settlement
to feature a choice for those on the Plaintiffs’ Steering Commit-
tee.  Lead lawyers negotiated a $6 million fee directly with the
defendant via a separate agreement—contingent, of course, on
fulfilling the participation percentages necessary to effectuate
the master settlement agreement—as well as a 5% attorneys’
fee assessment (with an additional 1% for costs).248  But the
court’s order required them to accept the lesser of the two—not
both.249  Leaders took the fee they negotiated directly with the
defendant, which was likely far more profitable for them: it
appears that lead lawyers represented the bulk of the clients
(the court needed a new steering committee post-settlement
since most members settled all their clients’ claims),250 so the
defendant may have compensated the steering committee for
work they were already required to perform under their initial
contingent-fee agreement.  Put differently, lead lawyers likely
received their full contingent fees plus a $6 million bonus from
defendants.251
Sometimes, even when lead lawyers negotiate aspects of
their fees directly with the defendant, those fees come out of
other plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.  By inserting fee provisions into
a master settlement such that claimants (and their counsel)
who want to settle must also “consent” to leadership’s height-
ened fee, lead attorneys can reach settling state-court plaintiffs
246 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012)
(order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. June 2, 2005)
(order).
247 Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final
Distribution of Remaining Funds at 3–4, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-
md-1355 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-
1355 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (order).
248 Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from
the Biomet Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund § 7, In re Biomet M2A Man-
gum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015)
(“Pursuant to a separately negotiated settlement agreement dated January 31,
2014, the Biomet Common Benefit Settlement Agreement (CBSA), Biomet will
deposit an additional $6 million into the Biomet Common Benefit Attorney’s Fee
Fund for the sole purpose of resolving the Common Benefit Attorney Fees associ-
ated with this litigation.”).
249 In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. § II.B.2(c), No.
12-md-2391 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2014) (case management order establishing com-
mon benefit fee and expense funds § 2(c)).
250 In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2391
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2015) (order).
251 See supra note 248 (noting the $6 million fee). R
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who would otherwise fall outside of the transferee judge’s juris-
diction.  In Actos and Fosamax, lead lawyers included a provi-
sion that subjected all settling plaintiffs—including those
pending in state courts—to the transferee judge’s fee assess-
ment.252  And, in Fosamax, if a lawyer waited until settlement
to agree to the common-benefit tax (as many state-court attor-
neys would) then the court’s common-benefit fund order in-
creased the assessment from 6 to 9%.253  Lead lawyers in Vioxx
went one step further: they contracted around the court’s 3%
fee cap, raised it to 8%, and deducted the entire amount from
individual attorneys’ contingent fees.254  Yet, unlike many of
the cases examined, the carte blanche revision incited numer-
ous objections.255  Accordingly, the judge appointed a liaison
counsel, who oversaw status conferences, discovery, briefing,
and arguments; eventually lead lawyers agreed to reduce their
fee request to 7.5%.256  Nevertheless, the judge reduced the
award to 6.5%, or $315,250,000 in fees—still a notable differ-
ence from the initial 3%.257
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup was notable for initially deviating
from this pattern, but then following it.  The judge’s original
common-benefit order included a 4% fee, permitted the court to
adjust that percentage based on factors in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and expressly struck language that
taxed state-court litigants.258  After the court repeatedly re-
duced common-benefit holdbacks in individual cases,259 the
lead lawyers asked for a new order applying the holdback to all
state-court plaintiffs who benefitted from their efforts.260  Cit-
ing both a lack of jurisdiction for doing so and noting that
252 Actos Settlement, supra note 209, § 10.04; Fosamax Settlement, supra note R
201, ¶ 14. R
253 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789, §§ 3–4  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2010) (case management order no. 17).
254 Vioxx Settlement, supra note 200, § 9.2.1. R
255 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47 (E.D. La. 2010);
Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2001–02 (2011).
256 Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 646–47.
257 Id. at 655, 658.
258 Case Management Order No. 3: Order Establishing Common Benefit Fund,
¶¶ 3, 11, In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J.
Jan. 21, 2011).
259 E.g., In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414
(D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011) (order reducing common-benefit contribution to 1%); In re
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. June 8,
2011) (same).
260 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify Case Management Order No. 3 to Provide for
Contribution to the Common Benefit Fund by State-Court Plaintiffs, In re Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2015).
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leaders had not conferred benefits on the state plaintiffs, the
court refused.261  Nevertheless, when leaders negotiated a
master settlement, they included a provision that unilaterally
taxed all settling plaintiffs 4%.262  The court then ordered all
multidistrict plaintiffs to participate in the settlement, comply
with its deadlines, or face dismissal.263  Because the settlement
required all participating lawyers to register all their cases (filed
or unfiled, in state or federal court),264 lead lawyers effectively
used their bargaining authority with the defendant to expand
the federal court’s jurisdiction and their fee base.
Additionally, we observed a common practice of scaling up
fee assessments based on how quickly individual counsel as-
sented to common-benefit fees.  The Fosamax fee request and
order, for example, offered 3% fees and 3% costs for those who
consented (whether in federal or state court) to the assessment
agreement within 90 days, but increased the price to 5% fees
and 3% costs for latecomers; if an attorney waited to see
whether the lead lawyers actually negotiated a beneficial deal
for their clients, then fees and costs increased to 6 and 5,
respectively.265  Likewise, the Yasmin/Yaz litigation assessed
6% initially, and 10% for latecomers.266  Plainly, the point is to
incentivize early buy-in from the individual attorneys whose
contingency fees will be reduced even though the increase may
not align with quantum-meruit principles.267
3. Latecomer Reductions and Reversion Clauses
Finally, we observed two provisions that, while not as com-
mon as others, warrant increased scrutiny—latecomer reduc-
tions and reversion provisions.  Settlement designers in DePuy
ASR and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup experimented with a unique
clause that reduced payouts to claimants who were not repre-
261 In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J.
Apr. 30, 2015) (order on motion to modify CMO No. 3).
262 Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § V.C. R
263 In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414, ¶ 2
(D.N.J. May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement).
264 Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § I.B. R
265 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Authorities in Support of
Motion for Creation of a Common Benefit Fund at 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (requesting a 10% total assess-
ment for those who waited until settlement); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (case management order no. 17 at 3–4).
266 In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 09-md-2100, §§ 3–4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2010) (case management order
no. 14 (establishing common benefit fee and expense fund) at 3–4).
267 Burch, supra note 20, at 128–35. R
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sented by counsel as of a certain date.268  The idea was to
thwart the Field-of-Dreams problem for the defendant: creating
a claims process can encourage attorneys and plaintiffs (often
with weaker claims) to emerge at the last minute, file suit, and
partake of the settlement.
To discourage this, latecomer provisions immediately re-
duced unrepresented claimants’ awards by 29% and covered
two groups of people: (1) those litigating pro se, and (2) those
who retained attorneys and filed suit after the identified date.
As to the former, DePuy ASR designers claimed that the reduc-
tion simply discounted pro se litigants’ payout to the same
amount they would have received if they had to pay attorneys’
fees, but noted, “there will be an additional Court approved
deduction for common benefit fees and expenses.”269  The sec-
ond group with counsel is even worse off, for they began with
29% less than those who retained counsel before the date and
will then have to pay their primary counsel’s fees and common-
benefit fees out of that reduced award.270  These latecomer pro-
visions help defendants by encouraging attorneys to file all of
their pending cases immediately and by discouraging further
attorney advertising.  Plus, the provisions are mostly costless
for lead lawyers who have advanced notice of the provision, can
file all of their claims, and, in DePuy ASR’s case, still receive
latecomers’ common-benefit fees.
In addition to the latecomer reductions, both DePuy ASR
settlements contained reversion clauses: the 29% taken off the
top of unrepresented plaintiffs’ claims reverted to DePuy, the
defendant.271 Propulsid made even greater use of reversion
clauses, initially reverting $40 million of an $87 million fund to
defendant Johnson & Johnson,272 then $5 million of the sec-
268 2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, § 4.4; 2015 DePuy Settlement, R
supra note 203, § 4.4; Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 208, § II.A.2.e. R
269 ASR Settlement – Benefits Overview at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/5FXT-ZZDH]; see also Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra
note 208, § V.C. (reducing common-benefit fees for unrepresented claimants to R
2%).
270 For an ethical analysis of this practice, see Burch, Monopolies, supra note
71, at 104–07. R
271 2013 DePuy Settlement, supra note 203, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7; 2015 DePuy R
Settlement, supra note 203, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7. R
272 Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to
Defendant Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-
1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355
(E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order).
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ond $15 million fund,273 and finally the remaining balance of
all settlement and administrative funds.274  In class actions,
reversion clauses have triggered additional scrutiny to deter-
mine whether the settlement’s terms were detrimental to the
class.275  Absent the class device, courts lack the formal au-
thority to oversee aggregate settlements, though they retain the




Nonclass aggregation has long fostered an uneasy union
between the individual and the collective.  This tension plays
out among scholars, as they consistently prioritize one over the
other: some want to use aggregation procedures to regulate
conduct efficiently and deter wrongdoing in order to maximize
social welfare, while others privilege individual autonomy and
consent over the general welfare, aiming to afford individual
justice to victims through their own day in court.277  While
273 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011)
(order).
274 In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2012)
(order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution pro-
gram and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund
and administrative fund after all payments due thereunder have been made).
275 Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., statement respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari); In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947–48 (9th Cir.
2011).
276 Burch, supra note 20, at 116–18, 128–38. R
277 For examples of those who tend to emphasize individual autonomy, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation, 10 J. L. & COM. 1,
32–33 (1990); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Au-
tonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573,
1573–75 (2007). Echoes of autonomy exist in Supreme Court opinions as well.
E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (discussing the idea of one’s own day in court).  For examples
of those adopting a collective or efficiency-based approach, see Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 479, 479–84 (1997); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561–68 (1987); David
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass Expo-
sure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 210–16 (1996). Still others have recommenda-
tions for mitigating between these two camps to protect both individual and group
interests. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–32 (1996); Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do
That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 858–59 (1994);
Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821,
1821–22 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 918, 918–22 (1995). Some of these demarcations come from David L.
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social networks do not ease this fundamental tension, they do
allow us to consider both individuals and groups—to under-
stand how interconnections and interactions among people
and events affect attorneys’ fees and claims resolution, and
how those fees and results may impact individuals’ perceptions
about the justice system.
Mapping the network of attorneys and proceedings and
then analyzing the deals that repeat players design provides us
with some insight into the flow of information between con-
nected repeat players, the replication and refinement of prac-
tices, and how well-connected leaders might use their
positional influence within the network to create, disseminate,
and perpetuate norms and practices that benefit their working
relationships.  As past work considered how these cases com-
pared with non-aggregated litigation and how they proceeded
through federal courts,278 the next logical step was to examine
who shepherded these cases through the legal system and how
they resolved them without Rule 23’s protections.  Accordingly,
this Article considered who the repeat lawyers are in a sample
of products-liability and sales-practices proceedings, the con-
nections between them, the nonclass settlements they de-
signed, and the common-benefit fees they received.
Consistent with past findings, repeat players do exist, and
they serve in leadership positions that allow them to negotiate
master settlements.  As we elaborate in this Part, those posi-
tions likewise afford them influence.  And their connectedness
in the network may allow them to diffuse, adapt, and replicate
practices that benefitted them financially.279  Consequently,
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913,
914–16 n.3–4 (1998).
278 Catherine R. Borden, Emery G. Lee III & Margaret S. Williams, Centripetal
Forces: Multidistrict Litigation and Its Parts, 75 LA. L. REV. 425, 425–27 (2014).
279 For example, Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies appointed an editorial
board of six attorneys to create a “MDL Standards and Best Practices” guide.
Each board member is a high-level repeat player.  Chilton Varner, of King &
Spalding, is a defense attorney who litigated Fosamax and Paxil.  John Beisner, of
Skadden Arps, is a defense attorney who litigated Vioxx and DePuy ASR and his
law firm appeared seven times on the defense side in the data.  Elizabeth
Cabraser, of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, is a plaintiffs’ attorney who was
appointed as a lead lawyer six times and lawyers for her firm were appointed a
total of seventeen times.  Christopher Seeger, of Seeger Weiss LLP, is a plaintiffs’
attorneys who was appointed as a lead lawyer fourteen times in the data and
lawyers from his firm were appointed a total of twenty times.  Ted Mayer, of
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, is a defense attorney who litigated Fosamax and Vioxx.
Daniel Girard, of Girard Gibbs, did not appear in the data since the focus was on
products-liability cases and he specializes in securities suits, but his law firm
appeared on the defense team of seven product-liability cases.  See also Tables
3–4, A2–A3, supra at 34–36, infra at 72–74 (listing repeat players).
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this Part begins by discussing our findings on repeat players’
impact, then postulates that these repetitive interactions could
add to classic principal-agent problems by desensitizing law-
yers to behavior that benefits counsel more than clients.  We
then situate multidistrict litigation within the rich literature on
other complex adaptive systems and use those core insights to
suggest that future reformers would do well to consider how
network connectivity affects their efforts to provoke systemic
change.
A. Repeat Players’ Impact
To begin to gauge repeat players’ impact, we obtained and
analyzed the thirteen publicly available, private nonclass set-
tlements that occurred in ten multidistrict litigations within
our dataset, which collectively covered 64,107 actions.  In ex-
amining those settlements, we looked for four types of provi-
sions: (1) those that generate closure (attorney-
recommendation, attorney-withdrawal, walkaway, and case-
census provisions); (2) those where lead lawyers negotiate some
aspect of their fees with a defendant either directly or through
the settlement; (3) those that reduced awards to latecomers;
and (4) those that allowed the money remaining in the settle-
ment fund to revert to defendants.  Closure, latecomer, and
reversion provisions benefit defendants, while common-benefit
fee provisions reward lead plaintiffs’ lawyers.  When courts and
the parties made the claims-filing data public, which was rare,
we considered that information as well.280
As evidenced previously in Table 6, we found that at least
one of our top five repeat players (based on degree centrality)
participated directly in each settled litigation’s leadership.  The
Propulsid settlement designers noted they were creating a tem-
plate for settlement, and they were correct.  Every nonclass
settlement in our database after it contained some of its fea-
tures and at least one closure-related provision to help end the
lawsuits.
280 For an overview of what little information was available, see Burch, Monop-
olies, supra note 71, at 131–32, Table 3. R
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FIGURE 9: SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS IN THE THIRTEEN
EXAMINED SETTLEMENTS
Each settlement uniformly departed from conventional
deals between plaintiffs and defendants, shifting the deal-mak-
ing entities to lead lawyers and defendants, and then requiring
individual attorneys to either become additional signatories or
recommend the deal to all of their clients if one client wanted to
settle.  Additionally, as Figure 9 illustrates, every settlement
permitted the defendant to walk away from its funding obliga-
tions if too few claimants abandoned their right to sue in the
judicial system in favor of the settlement’s claims-administra-
tion process.  Combined, these changes tied plaintiffs’ attor-
neys’ financial self-interest to each other, for none of them
would receive fees if too few claimants accepted the settlement
offer.  Also like Propulsid, two settlements took the added step
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of explicitly requiring attorneys to withdraw from representing
clients who refused to settle.
Common-benefit fee and settlement-fund distribution
practices were remarkably similar, with plaintiffs’ leadership
often negotiating a fee increase for themselves at the end of a
proceeding.  Moreover, in two of the eleven litigations, Propulsid
and Biomet, lead lawyers negotiated their fees directly with the
defendant, such that the fees were not apportioned from the
common fund (in accordance with a restitution theory),281 but
from the defendant’s coffers.  In six other litigations—Vioxx,
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR, Fosamax, Actos, and Zimmer Durom
Hip Cup—lead lawyers included some aspect of their common-
benefit fee within the settlement, which meant negotiating their
compensation with the defendant.  Bargaining over attorneys’
fees with one’s opponent—even if subject to court approval—is
a unilateral move away from contingent fees, which are de-
signed to tie the fates of lawyer and client by increasing fees in
proportion with a client’s actual recovery.
Finally, both DePuy ASR settlements and the Zimmer
Durom Hip Cup settlement contained latecomer reductions,
which help defendants by discouraging attorney advertising
and reducing payouts.  And two litigations (each producing two
settlements)—Propulsid and DePuy ASR—included provisions
in which all or part of the remaining settlement funds reverted
to the defendants.  In DePuy ASR, the reversion clause worked
in concert with the settlement’s practice of reducing payouts to
latecomers since those funds reverted to the defendant.
In sum, we found robust empirical evidence of repeat-
player attorneys on both the plaintiff and defense side as well
as a multidistrict-litigation leadership network that contains a
strong, cohesive center.  The lack of formal rules in multidis-
trict proceedings allows these repeat players to shape the
methods for selecting and compensating leadership, and the
lack of formal judicial oversight in nonclass settlements affords
repeat players considerable latitude in settlement design.
Based on the limited nonclass settlements available to us,
we found reason to be concerned that when repeat players
influence the practices and norms that govern multidistrict
proceedings—when they “play for rules,” so to speak—the
practices they develop, cite, and replicate may principally bene-
fit them at one-shot plaintiffs’ expense.  While we were often
281 Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663–66 (1991).
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unable to obtain claims-rate or payout information that was
filed under seal or kept private, many of the settlement provi-
sions appear to enrich lead plaintiffs’ lawyers and the defend-
ants with whom they broker the deal—not one-shot
plaintiffs.282  If claims-administration data were available, it
could provide a more complete and robust picture of the benefit
these practices confer on claimants.
Given the data available to us, however, over a twenty-two-
year span, we were unable to find any publicly available non-
class settlement that did not feature at least one closure provi-
sion (which benefits the defendant).  And, excepting NuvaRing,
where the transferee court taxed settling state-court plaintiffs
directly,283 and American Medical Systems, where fees were not
available, each settlement likewise contained some provision
that increased lead lawyers’ fees.  While one could argue that
we cannot claim causation with such evidence (and to be fair,
we are not trying to do so), the mere fact that the same play-
ers appear in the vast majority of these cases, resulting in
remarkably similar settlements that benefit the people design-
ing them merits concern and warrants further empirical
investigation.284
B. Implications for Leverage, Ethics, and Collusion
A highly concentrated plaintiff and defense bar is nothing
new, nor is the disquiet about where that concentration may
lead.  As scholars have long recognized, repeat play tends to
regress our adversarial system from its confrontational roots
toward a state of cooperation.285  In the criminal context, pros-
ecutors and public defenders routinely work together through
plea bargaining, leading them toward mutual accommodation;
incumbents form a primary community of interest, whereas
282 Anecdotal evidence is rife with mistrust of the deals these lawyers create.
See, e.g., Barry Meier, Frustration from a Deal on Flawed Hip Implants, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2013, at B1 (“But some patients contend that the deal’s real winners are
Johnson & Johnson and the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Those lawyers are set to receive
about one-third of the settlement, or about $800 million.  The single biggest
chunk of those fees will go to the firms most involved with developing cases
against Johnson & Johnson and negotiating the settlement; they will get a bonus
of about $160 million.”).
283 Common Benefit Order at 3–4, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-
md-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011).
284 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System,
11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 53 (1967) (“[A]s in all institutions based on conflict,
there is a perception of ‘deviance’ when actors who are supposed to be genuinely
antagonistic begin to cooperate.”).
285 Id. at 68–69.
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clients present secondary challenges and contingencies.286  As
such, adversary features are often overshadowed by regulars’
quid pro quo needs.287  As Professor Jerome Skolnick has ex-
plained, those working group relationships become a social
control problem only once they reach a “tipping point where
cooperation may shade off into collusion, thereby subverting
the ethical basis of the system.”288
In 1995, Professor John Coffee lamented in the class con-
text, “[t]hese circumstances supply the preconditions for collu-
sion between defendants and a favored plaintiffs’ counsel:
repeat players, a single forum in which the court is eager to
achieve a global settlement, and ‘passive’ future claimants.”289
He went on to distinguish between “old” collusion, where there
is an actual or implicit agreement in which defendants settle
cheaply in exchange for higher plaintiffs’ attorneys fees,290 and
“new” collusion through inventory settlements as side deals to
a settlement class, double-dipping by serving as both class
counsel and individual counsel for opt-outs, and striking deals
that restrict claimants’ eligibility through rigorous claims crite-
ria.291  Some of these scenarios resonate with the settlements
examined, such as Propulsid’s claims process, reversion
clauses, and direct fee negotiation; Biomet’s direct fee agree-
ment with the defendant and potentially doubled attorneys’
fees; DePuy ASR’s reversion clause; and both DePuy ASR and
Zimmer Durom Hip Cup’s reductions for nonclient, unrepre-
sented plaintiffs, which are similar to paying one’s inventory
clients more than class members—a practice the Supreme
Court struck down in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.292
Of course, there are some important distinctions between
class and nonclass aggregation: nonclass aggregation cannot
bind those not before the court as a class action can.  Because
plaintiffs are present and have filed suit, conventional thinking
suggests that plaintiffs’ consent to settle is enough; there is no
need to layer in judicial supervision as there is when absent
286 Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organi-
zational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 20–21, 24 (1967).
287 Id. at 24.
288 Skolnick, supra note 284, at 69. R
289 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1366–67 (1995).
290 Id. at 1367.
291 Id. at 1373–78.
292 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854 (1999).
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class members’ rights are at stake.  But our findings suggest
that attorneys’ financial interests may muddy plaintiffs’ con-
sent since clients typically follow their attorney’s advice.293
Lawyers’ finances may be intertwined with each other not only
through settlement provisions that condition the deal (and at-
torneys’ fees) on achieving a certain plaintiff participation rate,
but also through formal joint venture agreements and informal
promises to distribute common-benefit work and leadership
positions to allies.  Longstanding principal-agent research sug-
gests that agents’ financial self-interest may color their advice
to clients.294  Just as they do in the class action and criminal
context, repeat players face systemic temptations to be more
loyal to each other or even to defendants, than to their own
clients.295
Individual plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lack of litigation leverage
and power may compound these temptations.  Ordinarily, even
an out-gunned and out-manned plaintiffs’ lawyer squaring off
against a well-heeled defendant can threaten to take a case to
trial on a shoestring budget.  But multidistrict litigation takes
away that bargaining chip for all but a handful of bellwether
cases; transferee judges rarely remand cases for trial.296  When
combined with plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interlaced financial inter-
ests and a tightly connected social network, that lack of lever-
age against defendants turns into a lack of power for individual
attorneys who might otherwise act as a check on questionable
settlement practices.
Repeat players’ relationships with one another may like-
wise play a critical role in creating social norms and perpetuat-
ing practices that push ethical boundaries.  Regular interaction
could lead plaintiffs’ attorneys to have stronger social and rela-
tional ties to each other than to one-time clients, and could
prompt them to identify as a group.297  Groups tend to catalyze
293 See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers
Have Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 277, 285 (2007); Gordon,
supra note 32, at 30; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 32, at 82; Jean R. Ster- R
nlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psy-
chology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 269, 291–97, 318–19 (1999).
294 John C. Coffee, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 331, 340–41 (2000); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass
Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 301, 302 (2003).
295 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. R
296 Burch, supra note 58, at 410–20. R
297 See ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 177–78 (“A group is close-knit when R
informal power is broadly distributed among group members and the information
pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.”); Blumberg, supra
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when people work toward a common goal like prevailing
against a particular defendant, share physical and social im-
mediacy as leaders must when working together, and have
overlapping common norms such as those inherent in cham-
pioning citizens’ rights.298  Once a group forms, research
shows that members exhibit other-regarding preferences—
trust, reciprocity, and altruism—toward other members.299
Enduring groups comprised of long-term friends, colleagues,
and business associates tend to cooperate to achieve the best
collective outcome for the group.300  And studies demonstrate
that their fairness considerations can change based on
whether the situation involves another group member (inclu-
sionary concerns for other repeat actors, perhaps) or individu-
als outside the group (exclusionary concerns for one-time
clients).301
Should members observe other members at the top of the
social hierarchy (perhaps those who rank highly in degree cen-
trality) acting unethically, then that behavior may become the
descriptive norm.302  When the lines between ethical and un-
ethical behavior are blurred, as they are in an aggregate litiga-
tion system founded on an individual dispute resolution
model,303 people tend to categorize their actions positively so as
to avoid impacting their own self-image.304  If group members
embrace higher levels of unethical behavior, then that behavior
note 286, at 24; Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A R
Social Network Perspective, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 14, 17 (1998).
298 See Albert A. Cota et al., The Structure of Group Cohesion, 21 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 572, 574, 577 (1995); R. Scott Tindale et al., Shared Cognition
in Small Groups, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES
1, 5 (Michael A. Hoagg & R. Scott Tindale, eds., 2001).
299 See Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let’s Get Personal: An International Examina-
tion of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Re-
garding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374–75 (2006) (reviewing the
literature on other-regarding preferences).
300 See ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 167 (“[M]embers of a close-knit group R
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate
welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another.”); Leigh
Thompson et al., Cohesion and Respect: An Examination of Group Decision Making
in Social and Escalation Dilemmas, 34 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 289, 291–92
(1998).
301 Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Intrinsic Versus Community-Based Justice
Models: When Does Group Membership Matter?, 46 J. SOC. ISSUES 83, 84–86
(1990).
302 Gina et al., supra note 24, at 394, 396, 398. R
303 Baker, supra note 23, at 298–304. R
304 See M.E. Schwitzer & C.K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification
and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
185, 185–86 (2002).
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can turn into an accepted practice.305  Put simply, unethical
behavior, particularly among in-group members, can be
contagious.306
In-groups comprised of highly connected actors likewise
tend to police themselves internally through social and finan-
cial sanctions.307  As the social network illustrates, repeat
players form dyadic relationships to others, which not only
allows knowledge of common settlement practices to flow freely
among them, but also information about cooperative and unco-
operative behaviors, and attorneys’ reputations as collabora-
tors, contrarians, or defectors.  The easy flow of information
may enable leaders to credibly punish and reward others for
following or disregarding norms, which decreases the likeli-
hood that information about tacit or explicit collusion would
surface or that members would raise ethical concerns about
settlement practices on their client’s behalf.308  Our anecdotal
evidence bears this out.  In-group attorneys spoke with us
freely only on the condition of anonymity, for defecting in one
proceeding could prompt financial repercussions in concurrent
and future proceedings.  After all, when judges defer to attor-
neys to pick their own leaders through the consensus method
and appoint lead lawyers to serve on fee-allocation committees,
they can give repeat players substantial enforcement tools.
This leaves us with a new variant on the timeless principal-
agent concern that, without monitoring, agents may disserve
their principals to benefit themselves: lead lawyers as agents
may disserve out-group principals with whom they seldom in-
teract to immediately benefit lead lawyers’ collective interests
305 See Gina et al., supra note 24, at 393–94; see also Fehr & Fischbacher, R
supra note 24, at 186–87 (discussing the relationship between social norms and R
punishment).
306 See Gina et al., supra note 24, at 398. R
307 E.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 208–10, 225–29, 230–33. R
308 See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 18, at 160–61 (noting how networks R
among boards of directors allow for collusion and market manipulation); Fehr &
Fischbacher, supra note 24, at 187–88 (2004) (observing that where opportunities R
to punish exist, “cooperation flourishes” and that punishment might occur “be-
cause [the subjects] view unilateral defection as an unfair act that violates the
conditional cooperation norm and thus deserves retaliation”); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 159, 168–70 (2000) (finding that in situations with incomplete con-
tracts—like those for distributing common-benefit work and common-benefit
funds among multidistrict litigation attorneys—the power to behave reciprocally
by rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors substantially contributes to
contract enforcement).
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and to better their own, individual interests over time.309  At-
torneys on the social network’s periphery might further their
own interests by cooperating with questionable practices; this
could earn them trust from the current group leaders and posi-
tion them for future leadership roles as well as the lucrative
common-benefit fees that accompany them.  It likewise adds
insight into the path dependencies that led to Professor Coffee’s
conclusion that “[o]nce bent, legal rules tend to stay bent.”310
Questionable practices may be entrenched and replicated not
only because they benefit repeat actors, but because they
might be woven into the legal, social, and ethical culture.
C. Implications for Law Reform
Stepping back and looking more broadly at the social net-
work suggests that the behaviors of controlling stakeholders—
plaintiffs’ attorneys, defense attorneys, defendants, and even
judges—cannot be understood in isolation.  As social norms so
aptly illustrate, each agent adjusts to feedback from a variety of
sources and circumstances such as Rule 23’s absence, judicial
selection criteria, agents’ needs, parties’ desires, ethical cul-
tures, legislation, and of course the underlying facts and law.
Agents adapt.311  As the evolution of Propulsid’s settlement pro-
visions demonstrate, new practices emerge from past suc-
cesses and failures.  Dissecting the discrete settlements that
repeat actors design and viewing them in the aggregate allows
us to identify emergent properties and trends.312
Understanding how these agents interact, change, and ac-
climate—what, in other words, makes multidistrict litigation
complex—can help us formulate more realistic and useful pro-
positions about how we might improve the system.  Of course,
some existing theories already explain basic interactions.  For
instance, the prisoner’s dilemma—where players decide
whether to cooperate with one another by staying silent or to
defect by giving the other player up in return for a shorter
sentence—helps us understand bilateral, strategic interactions
309 See Blumberg, supra note 286, at 24 (“Close and continuing relations R
between the lawyer ‘regular’ and his former colleagues in the prosecutor’s office
generally overshadow the relationship between the regular and his client.”).
310 Coffee, supra note 289, at 1463. R
311 MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 50, 53, 178–81. R
312 See id. at 46 (discussing theories of emergence); Tom De Wolf & Tom
Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising
When Combined, in ENGINEERING SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS: METHODOLOGIES AND
APPLICATIONS 1, 3 (Sven A. Brueckner et al. eds., 2005).
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without much complexity.313  Likewise, tit-for-tat strategies in
repeated situations—where players cooperate upon first inter-
acting with someone, but retaliate when cooperation is not re-
ciprocated—can help us understand how interconnected
repeat players may profit more financially over time by working
together than objecting to questionable practices.314  It can
also shed light on why a one-shotter attorney may be better off
defecting (by objecting when excluded from leadership or not
cooperating when the usual practices diverge from her client’s
best interest, for example) unless she hopes to become a repeat
player.315
But these traditional analytic tools tend to break down
when many people interact—multiple claimants, attorneys, de-
fendants, judges, rules committees, and legislatures.316  It is
the difference between tic-tac-toe and chess.317  Unlike conven-
tional tools, complex adaptive systems theory, the theory that
underpins social network analysis, allows us to consider
agents’ interconnectivity.
Characterizing multidistrict litigation as a complex adap-
tive system alongside things like cities, stock markets, and
grasslands provides a way to explore the complexity and adap-
tivity inherent in those proceedings.318  Across the board, these
systems share characteristics that are not perfectly patterned,
completely random, or entirely chaotic.  Instead, they include
sophisticated agents who evolve to capitalize on changing cir-
cumstances, and act strategically in ways that are sometimes
rational and sometimes not.319  Like other complex adaptive
systems, multidistrict proceedings include diverse, connected,
interdependent, networked agents that interact repeatedly and
313 M.A. Nowak & R.M. May, Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos, 359
NATURE 826, 826 (1992); M.A. Nowak, & R.M. May, The Spatial Dilemmas of
Evolution, 3 INT’L J. BIFURCATION & CHAOS 1, 35–36 (1993).
314 See generally R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION CORPORATION (1984); Fehr &
Fischbacher, supra note 24, at 186. R
315 E.g., Alison Frankel, Lance Cooper Lost Big in Attack on GM Lead Counsel—
but Did MDL Process Win?, REUTERS, Feb. 11, 2016 (discussing non-repeat player
Lance Cooper’s objections to lead lawyers’ conduct in litigation against General
Motors); Barry Meier, Lawyer for Plaintiffs Suing G.M. Steps Up Criticism of An-
other, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2016, at B4 (same).
316 See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 221. R
317 See id. at 220.
318 No single definition exists, but a good working definition is as follows: “the
study of systems comprised of a macroscopic, heterogeneous set of autonomous
agents interacting and adapting in response to one another and to external envi-
ronment inputs.”  J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. L. REV. 885,
893 (2008).
319 See SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 7–8 (2011).
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generate adaptive outcomes that cannot be isolated into their
component parts.320  The patterns that emerge are neither
completely ordered nor totally arbitrary.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers do
not randomly pair with one another to form coalitions (as mod-
els for considering the spread of disease often assume), nor
does everyone within the plaintiffs’ bar interact simultaneously
with everyone else (like political models often suppose).
Complexity arises when agents like repeat players depend
on each other and that dependence spurs system-wide ef-
fects.321  Take grasslands, for example.  The species in that
environment interact in many different ways, which builds net-
work connectivity.  Substituting one agent, say a “sit-and-wait”
spider (or an experienced but less centrally networked attor-
ney) with an “active hunting” spider (a central repeat player)
can set off a chain reaction: to avoid becoming the active spi-
der’s prey, grasshoppers change their feeding strategy, which
likewise alters vegetation.322  Agents adapt through feedback
and produce effects beyond their bilateral interactions.  Once
active hunting spiders infiltrate an area as repeat players have
done in multidistrict leadership, they may create a pattern that
makes inroads by sit-and-wait spiders increasingly difficult,
thereby establishing “path dependence.”323
Path dependence isn’t limited to grasslands and spiders.
When Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA), for example, it aimed to reform and dislodge class-
action lawyers—Milberg Weiss, in particular—by creating a
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the one with
the largest financial interest.324  Congress’s hope was that this
would instill a sophisticated, incentivized entity to monitor
plaintiffs’ lawyers.  But rather than displacing large plaintiffs’
firms, the PSLRA entrenched them;325 one study published
eight years after PSLRA’s enactment showed Milberg Weiss as
lead or co-lead counsel in over 50% of the cases.326  Why? To
gain institutional clients with the biggest stakes, the plaintiffs’
320 See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 221; PAGE, supra note 319, at 7–8, 38; R
Ruhl, supra note 318, at 889. R
321 See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 9. R
322 Ruhl, supra note 318, at 887. R
323 Id. at 894.
324 S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6, n.8 (1995) (citing William P. Barrett, I Have No
Clients, FORBES 52 (Oct. 11, 1993) (quoting William Lerach)).
325 Tamara Loomis, Milberg Weiss Stronger than Ever Despite Reform Act, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 2003, at 4.
326 LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM
ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 14
(2003).
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bar had to spend significant resources to advertise, effectively
boxing smaller firms out of the market.327  In short, the PSLRA
actually benefitted larger, moneyed plaintiffs’ firms like Milberg
Weiss, created a concentrated bar, and established path
dependence.
Likewise, when transferee judges use experience, coopera-
tive tendencies, and an ability to finance the litigation as pri-
mary factors in selecting lead lawyers in multidistrict litigation,
they entrench repeat players in leadership roles.  But path de-
pendence is not path permanence.  Just as the active hunting
spider might be “locked in” for now, another key feature of the
complex adaptive system is “stable disequilibrium.”328  Change
can constantly occur.  If sit-and-wait spiders are less suscepti-
ble to harsh winters than the active hunting spider, then a
particularly cold winter might prompt conditions ripe for
change.329  Similarly, if non-repeat players faithfully defend
their clients’ best interests against their own self-interest and
the self-interest of lead lawyers, then ethical clarifications and
external measures that promote competition might provoke
change, too.  External adjustments such as the passage of the
Class Action Fairness Act can upset the balance in complex
litigation as well.330  Nevertheless, because of agents’ adaptiv-
ity, most change is incremental—not dramatic; entrenched
agents are resilient, as the PSLRA example illustrates.
What then can we learn from situating multidistrict litiga-
tion as a complex adaptive system?  First, drawing from its rich
interdisciplinary literature, its core ideas, and its metaphors
allows us make more realistic assumptions about the social
activity, information, and behaviors that are likely to occur
within multidistrict litigation’s social network.331  There are
certain patterns that emerge and hold true across all complex
adaptive systems—ecosystems, political elections, and econo-
mies, for instance.  Here are two: (1) diversity typically en-
hances complex systems’ functionality and contributes to
innovation and productivity; and (2) complex systems need
327 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1593, 1604–05 (2008).
328 Ruhl, supra note 318, at 895. R
329 Id.
330 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat.
4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Erichson, supra note 327, at R
1604–05.
331 See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 17, at 230 (observing that “there are deep R
commonalities—ones that do not respect the usual academic boundaries—across
the various systems we observe in the world”).
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competition to flourish and diversity drives competition.332
When the same actors work together repeatedly, their thinking
tends to converge, and emphasizing cooperation can dampen
competition that might otherwise serve to safeguard plaintiffs’
best interests.333
Second, using social network analysis to map connections
between agents in multidistrict litigation reveals links that can-
not be seen by the naked eye.  Those connections allow us to
develop some working hypotheses about the level of repeat play
and the kind of social interactions that might occur when
agents encounter one another in well-defined networks.  Con-
sider three such possibilities.  First, when attorneys become
lead lawyers, they and their allies have the power to distribute
common-benefit work, suggest fee allocations, and report un-
cooperative behavior to the judge—carrots and sticks, in other
words.334  Second, judicial focus on experience, financial re-
sources, and cooperation means that lead attorneys not only
possess power in the current litigation, but will almost always
have concurrent and future leadership opportunities to credi-
bly punish or reward other attorneys.  Finally, unlike game-
theoretic computer exercises, repeat players likely have inside
information about past behaviors and transactions through di-
rect knowledge, gossip, and news reports.  In short, reciprocity
and reputation may prove integral to this close-knit group of
lawyers: they may share information easily through their net-
work, exercise power in future litigations, and credibly sanc-
tion and reward one another for following or disregarding
norms that promote their collective interests.
Third, from there we can diagnose probable systemic dys-
functions.  Multidistrict litigation is designed to promote pre-
332 See PAGE, supra note 319, at 8–9, 215–17. R
333 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY GROUPS GO TO EXTREMES (2008) (con-
tending that deliberation among groups with diverse opinions prevents extrem-
ism); SUNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 145–47 (arguing that checks and balances in R
partisan politics constrains group polarization and extreme movements).  Unlike
group polarization and groupthink, confirmation bias is an individual bias that
can be exacerbated or mollified by group decision-making. See Dieter Frey, Re-
cent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 52–53 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986); Stefan Schulz-Hardt
et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 656–58 (2000).
334 Judges often appoint lead lawyers to fee allocation committees and solicit
input on how to distribute attorneys’ fees.  Dubay, supra note 59, at 55–56, Tbl. R
13.; see, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. June 13,
2012) (order appointing lead lawyers to fee allocation committee).  Power need not
be equal among members; they must simply have enough authority to credibly
threaten to punish defectors. ELLICKSON, supra note 66, at 178–79. R
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trial efficiency and consistency without altering core due
process rights such as adequate representation and the right to
have one’s day in court.  But settlements with provisions that
principally benefit the attorneys or the defendant at the plain-
tiffs’ expense might indicate that efficiency has trumped ade-
quate representation.335  Recalibration may be in order.
Fourth, we can recognize the limited capacity to dramati-
cally change the status quo and instead propose malleable
methods that work with—not against—the inertia of a complex
adaptive system.  While federal rules committees and legisla-
tures may seek changes that provoke paradigm shifts,336 the
reality is that attorneys in this elite bar are adaptive, resilient,
and likely to withstand these adjustments.  Thus, the broader
lesson is that enhancing functionality within multidistrict liti-
gation may not hinge on top-down or external legislative re-
forms, but in harnessing an equally adaptive power that
already lies within the system itself: competition.337  As the
vast literature on collateral attacks in the class-action context
illustrates, the plaintiffs’ bar is highly competitive.338  But judi-
cial selection methods and deference to repeat players may
have muted open rivalry by encouraging and rewarding cooper-
ation.  Interconnected agents who benefit from the status quo
are more likely to shun and ostracize objectors who threaten to
disrupt their practices—particularly if that objection could de-
rail a lucrative settlement.  Consequently, the question going
forward becomes how to tweak norms and design adjustments
that capitalize on pre-existing competitive forces such that
faithfully representing plaintiffs’ interests becomes more lucra-
tive than playing the long game.339
335 For an argument as to why Due Process protections of adequate represen-
tation should extend to nonclass multidistrict litigation in ways that are similar to
class actions, see Burch, supra note 71, at 158–61, 179. R
336 E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a), (b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Washington D.C., Apr. 9–10, 2015, at 39–41, available at http://www
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/
CV2015-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77P-4JU2]; Jeffrey D. Koelemay, Bill to Curb
Class Suits Clears Committee; Civil Rights Plaintiffs Thrown a Bone, 16 BNA CLASS
ACTION RPT. 718 (June 24, 2015).
337 For proposed reforms based on competition, see Burch, supra note 71, at R
168–85.
338 E.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting a
collateral attack); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inade-
quate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 384–87 (2000).
339 Building from the insights in this Article, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litiga-
tion proposes just such a theory.  Burch, supra note 71, at 135–54. R
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APPENDIX




Number Filed Coordinated Closed District 
In re: Asbestos Prod. Liab. 
Litig. (No. VI) 
875 1/17/91 7/29/91 pending E. D. 
Penn. 
In re: Factor VIII or IX 
Concentrate Blood Products 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
986 7/13/93 12/7/93 12/31/13 N. D. Ill. 
In re: Diet Drugs 
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/ 
Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1203 9/23/97 12/10/97 pending E. D. 
Penn. 
In re: Propulsid Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1355 5/24/00 8/7/00 10/21/13 E. D. La. 
In re: Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether ("MTBE") Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1358 6/6/00 10/10/00 pending S.D.N.Y 
In re: Baycol Prod. Liab. Litig. 1431 8/21/01 12/18/01 pending D. Minn. 
In re: Neurontin Marketing, 
Sales Practices and Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
1479 4/30/02 8/15/02 12/18/14 D. Mass. 
In re: Prempro Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1507 10/18/02 3/4/03 3/11/16 E.D. 
Ark. 
In re: Accutane (Isotrentinoin) 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1626 6/7/04 11/1/04 8/4/15 M. D. Fl. 
In re: Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig. 1657 10/8/04 2/16/05 pending E. D. La. 
In re: Ford Motor Co. E-350 
Van Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II) 
1687 3/16/05 6/16/05 7/15/13 D.N.J. 
In re: Ford Motor Co. Speed 
Control Deactivation Switch 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1718 7/15/05 8/9/06 8/6/13 E. D. 
Mich. 
In re: Celexa and Lexapro 
Prod. Liab. Litig.  
1736 11/9/05 2/17/06 9/4/13 E. D. 
Mo. 
In re: OrthoEvra Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1742 11/28/05 3/1/06 1/7/15 N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Aredia and Zometa Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
1760 1/27/06 4/18/06 9/26/14 M.D. 
Tenn. 
In re: Human Tissue Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
1763 2/7/06 6/13/07 11/5/13 D.N.J. 
In re: Fosamax Prod. Liab. 
Litig. (MDL 1789) 
1789 5/24/06 2/15/07 pending S.D.N.Y 
In re: Mirapex Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1836 2/6/07 6/22/07 pending D. Minn. 
In re: Kugel Mesh Hernia 
Patch Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1842 2/28/07 6/22/07 pending D. 
Rhode 
Island 
In re: ConAgra Peanut Butter 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1845 3/6/07 6/17/07 4/2/15 N. D. 
Ga. 
In re: Avandia Marketing Sales 
Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig.
1871 6/11/07 10/16/07 pending E. D. 
Penn. 
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Litigation Name 
MDL 
Number Filed Coordinated Closed District 
In re: FEMA Trailer 
Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1873 6/12/07 10/24/07 5/11/15 E. D. La. 
In re: Gadolinium Contrast 
Dyes Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1909 10/26/07 2/27/08 4/30/15 N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Trasylol Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1928 1/3/08 4/7/08 8/10/15 S. D. Fl. 
In re: Levaquin Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1943 2/19/08 6/13/08 pending D. Minn. 
In re: Heparin Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1953 4/4/08 6/6/08 9/23/16 N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Zurn Pex Plumbing 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
1958 4/21/08 8/21/08 8/1/13 D. Minn. 
In re: NuvaRing Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
1964 5/9/08 8/22/08 pending E. D. 
Mo. 
In re: Bisphenol-A (BPA) 
Polycarbonate Plastics Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
1967 5/23/08 8/13/08 7/19/13 W. D. 
Mo. 
In re: Whirlpool Corp. Front-
Loading Washer Prod. Liab. 
Litig. 
2001 9/26/08 12/20/08 9/29/16 N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Mentor Corp. ObTape 
Transobuturator Sling Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
2004 10/14/08 12/3/08 pending M. D. 
Ga. 
In re: Land Rover LR3 Tire 
Wear Products Liability 
Litigation 
2008 10/29/08 2/23/09 8/7/13 C. D. 
Cal. 
In re: Bayer Corp. 
Combination Asprin Prod. 
Marketing and Sales Practices 
Litig. 
2023 1/6/09 4/14/09 5/14/14 E.D.N.Y. 
In re: Apple iPhone 3G 
Products Liability Litigation 
2045 3/11/09 7/1/09 7/10/14 N. D. 
Cal. 
In re: Chinese-Manufactured 
Drywall Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2047 3/13/09 6/15/09 pending E. D. La. 
In re: Denture Cream 
Products Liab. Litig. 
2051 3/24/09 6/9/09 11/16/15 S. D. Fl.  
In re: Chantix Prod. Liab. Litig 2092 7/8/09 10/1/09 10/6/14 N.D. Al. 
In re: Yasmin and Yaz 
(Drospirenone) Marketing , 
Sales Practices Prod. Liab. 
Litig.  
2100 7/30/09 10/1/09 pending S. D. Ill.  
In re: IKO Roofing Shingle 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2104 8/12/09 12/3/09 pending C. D. Ill. 
In re: Toyota Motor Corp. 
Unintended Acceleration 
Marketing, Sales Practices, 
and Products Liab. Litig. 
2151 2/4/10 4/9/10 pending C. D. 
Cal. 
In re: Zimmer Durom Hip Cup 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2158 3/15/10 6/9/10 pending D.N.J.  
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Litigation Name 
MDL 
Number Filed Coordinated Closed District 
In re: Toyota Motor Corp. 
Hybrid Brake Marketing, Sales 
Practices, and Products Liab. 
Litig. 
2172 4/21/10 8/17/10 8/6/13 C.D Cal. 
In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
"Deepwater Horizon" in the 
Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 
2010 
2179 5/6/10 8/10/10 pending E. D. La. 
In re: C.R. Bard, Inc., Pelvic 
Repair System Prod. Liab. 
Litig.  
2187 7/15/10 10/12/10 pending S. D. W. 
Va.  
In re: Apple Inc. iPhone 4 
Marketing, Sales Practices & 
Prod. Liab. Lit. 
2188 7/15/10 10/8/10 7/29/13 N. D. 
Cal.  
In re: DePuy Orthopaedics 
Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
2197 9/3/10 12/3/10 pending N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Navistar 6.0 Diesel 
Engine Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2223 12/10/10 4/13/11 7/18/13 N. D. Ill.  
In re: Darvocet, Darvon and 
Propoxyphene Prod. Liab. 
Litig.  
2226 12/15/10 8/16/11 3/16/17 E.D. Ky. 
In re: Porsche Cars North 
America Inc. Plastic Coolant 
Tubes Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2233 2/16/11 5/23/11 3/19/14 S.D. 
Ohio 
In re: Fosamax (Alendronate 
Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. 
II) 
2243 3/24/11 2/3/12 pending D.N.J. 
In re: DePuy Orthopaedics, 
Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant 
Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2244 3/28/11 2/8/12 pending N.D. 
Texas 
In re: Zimmer Nexgen Knee 
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2272 6/6/11 8/8/11 pending E. D. Ill.  
In re: Building Materials 
Corporation of America 
Asphalt Roofing Shingle Prod. 
Liab. Litig. 
2283 7/14/11 10/11/11 7/15/14 D. S. 
Carolina 
In re: Imprelis Herbicide 
Marketing, Sales Practice, and 
Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2284 7/22/11 10/20/11 pending E. D. 
Penn.  
In re: Actos (Pioglitazone) 
Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2299 8/31/11 12/29/11 pending W. D. 
La. 
In re: Skechers Toning Shoe 
Prod. Liab.Litig. 
2308 9/30/11 12/19/11 pending W. D. 
Ky.  
In re: Ford Motor Co. Spark 
Plug and 3-Valve Engine Prod. 
Liab. Litig.  
2316 10/21/11 2/8/12 2/5/16 N.D. 
Ohio 
In re: American Medical 
Systems Inc., Pelvic Repair 
System, Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2325 11/23/11 2/7/12 pending S. D. W. 
Va. 
In re: Boston Scientific Corp 
Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. 
Litig. 
2326 11/28/11 2/7/12 pending S.D.W.V. 
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MDL 
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In re: Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic 
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig. 
2327 11/28/11 2/7/12 pending S. D. W. 
Va.  
In re: Wright Medical 
Technology, Inc., Conserve 
Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2329 11/29/11 2/8/12 pending N. D. 
Ga.  
In re: Propecia (Finasteride) 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2331 12/6/11 4/16/12 pending E.D.N.Y.  
In re: MI Windows & Doors, 
Inc., Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2333 12/8/11 4/23/12 8/4/15 D. S. 
Carolina 
In re: Zoloft (Sertraline 
Hydrochloride) Prod. Liab. 
Litig.  
2342 1/18/12 4/17/12 pending E. D. 
Penn.  
In re: Watson Fentanyl Patch 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2372 4/13/12 8/7/12 8/15/14 N. D. Ill.  
In re: Pradaxa (Dabigatran 
Etexilate) Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2385 5/30/12 8/8/12 pending S. D. Ill.  
In re: Coloplast Corp. Pelvic 
Support Sys. Prods. Liab. 
Litig. 
2387 6/5/12 8/6/12 pending S.D. W. 
Va. 
In re: Biomet M2a Magnum 
Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2391 6/27/12 10/2/12 pending N. D. 
Ind. 
In re: Nexium (Esomeprazole) 
Products Liability Litigation 
2404 8/27/12 12/6/12 1/4/17 C. D. 
Cal. 
In re: Plavix Marketing, Sales 
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig. 
(No. II) 
2418 10/15/12 2/12/13 pending D.N.J.  
In re: New England 
Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. 
Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2419 10/16/12 2/12/13 pending D. Mass. 
In re: Fresenius 
GranuFlo/NaturaLyte 
Dialysate Prod. Liab. Litig. 
2428 12/12/12 3/29/13 pending D. Mass. 
In re: Mirena IUD Prod. Liab. 
Litig.  
2434 1/16/13 4/8/13 8/9/16 S.D.N.Y 
In re: Tylenol (Acetaminophen) 
Marketing, Sales Practices and 
Prod. Liab. Litig.  
2436 1/17/13 4/1/13 pending E. D. 
Penn.  
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Arsenault, Richard 3 1 2 13 2 21 18 
Seeger, Christopher 1 2 3 12 2 21 16 
Nast, Dianne 2 1 2 12 2 19 14 
Becnel, Jr., Daniel 0 1 2 11 0 14 14 
Parker, Jerrold 0 0 1 10 0 11 11 
Conroy, Jayne 1 1 1  8 1 12 10 
Parfitt, Michelle 0 1 2  8 0 11 10 
Levin, Arnold 2 1 1  8 3 15  9 
Robinson, Jr., Mark 2 1 2  7 2 14 10 
London, Michael 2 2 2  7 1 14  9 
Crump, Martin 0 0 1  7 0  8  8 
DeBartolomeo, A.J. 0 0 0  7 0  7  7 
Flaherty, Yvonne 0 0 0  7 0  7  7 
Osborne, Joseph 0 0 0  7 0  7  7 
Thompson III, Fred 3 1 1  6 1 12  8 
Shkolnik, Hunter 1 0 1  6 1  9  8 
Restaino, John 1 0 1  6 2 10  7 
Cartmell, Thomas 0 0 2  6 0  8  7 
Dugan, II, James 0 0 0  6 1  7  7 
Zonies, Joseph 0 0 1  6 0  7  6 
Abrams, Rachel 0 0 0  6 0  6  6 
Blizzard, Edward 0 0 0  6 0  6  6 
Oliver, Alyson 0 0 0  6 0  6  6 
Lanier, W. Mark 1 0 3  5 2 11  8 
Flowers, Peter 1 0 2  5 0  8  7 
Matthews, David 0 0 1  5 1  7  7 
Meadow, Richard 0 0 0  5 2  7  7 
Anapol, Thomas 1 0 0  5 1  7  6 
Salim, Robert 1 1 0  5 0  7  6 
Monsour, Doug 0 0 0  5 1  6  6 
Garrard, III, Henry 3 1 1  5 1 11  5 
Chaffin, Eric 1 0 0  5 1  7  5 
Love, Scott 1 0 1  5 0  7  5 
Burnett, Jr., Riley 1 0 0  5 0  6  5 
Mueller, Mark 1 0 0  5 0  6  5 
Copeland, Erin 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Goetz, Michael 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Hauer, Stacy 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Maniatis, Victoria 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Miller, Michael 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Robins, III, Bill 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Saunders, Joseph 0 0 0  5 0  5  5 
Cabraser, Elizabeth 2 0 2  4 2 10  6 
Aylstock, Bryan 3 0 1  4 1  9  6 
Climaco, John 0 1 1  4 0  6  6 
Placitella, Christopher 0 2 0  4 0  6  6 
Potts, Derek 2 0 1  4 0  7  5 
Alonso, Andres 1 0 1  4 0  6  5 
Clarke, Clayton 0 0 2  4 0  6  5 
Grand, Jeff 0 0 1  4 1  6  5 
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TABLE A3: LEAD LAWYER FIRM APPEARANCES ON THE PLAINTIFFS’
SIDE IN PRODUCTS-LIABILITY AND SALES-PRACTICES
PROCEEDINGS
Firm Name 
Firm Appearances in  
MDL Proceedings 
Neblett Beard & Arsenault 18 
Lanier Law Firm 17 
Seeger Weiss, LLP 16 
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman 15 
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP 14 
Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles P.C.  12 
Motley Rice 11 
Weitz & Luxenberg 9 
Ashcraft & Gerel, LLP 9 
Zimmerman Reed 8 
Parker Waichman Alonso LLP 8 
Matthews & Associates 8 
Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli Co., LPA 8 
Wagstaff & Cartmell 7 
Robinson Calcagnie & Robinson 7 
Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes LLP 7 
Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A. 7 
Anapol Schwartz 7 
Cohen, Placitella & Roth 7 
Restaino Law Firm 6 
Johnson Becker 6 
Monsour Law Firm 6 
Law Offices of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr.  6 
Morgan & Morgan P.A.  6 
Blizzard, McCarthy & Nabers 6 
Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overhotz 6 
Foote Meyers Mielke & Flowers, P.C.  6 
Oliver Law Group 5 
Saunders & Walker 5 
Parker Waichman, LLP 5 
Reilly Pozner LLP 5 
Mueller Law 5 
Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, LLP 5 
Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis Inc.  5 
RodaNast P.C. 5 
Lewis & Roberts 5 
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP 5 
Hersh & Hersh 5 
Law Offices of Riley Burnett, Jr.  5 
Douglas & London 5 
Bernstein Liebhard, LLP 5 
Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC 5 
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Ashley, P.C. 5 
Audet & Partners, LLP 5 
Freese & Goss 5 
Becnel Law Firm LLC 5 
Murray Law Firm 4 
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